Jenner & Block Supreme Court and Appellate Clinic — Recent Cases

Since its launch in 2016, the clinic has represented parties in thirteen U.S. Supreme Court cases spanning a wide range of issues. The clinic also has filed numerous amicus curiae briefs, certiorari petitions, and briefs opposing certiorari in the U.S. Supreme Court.

In addition, in recent years, the clinic has represented clients in appeals before the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit in criminal, habeas corpus, and civil rights cases.

Recent U.S. Supreme Court Cases

Artis v. District of Columbia, Case No. 16-460, 138 S.Ct. 594 (2018), co-counsel for Petitioner Stephanie C. Artis

At issue was how to calculate the statute of limitations when state-law claims initially are filed in federal court, but then are dismissed by the federal court because it declines to exercise jurisdiction. The Court ruled in favor of Ms. Artis, holding that the applicable federal statute “stops the clock” on the limitations period for the state-law claims while they are pending in federal court.

Cochran, et al., v. Gresham, et al., and Arkansas v. Gresham, et al., Case Nos. 20-37 and 20-38, co-counsel for Respondents Charles Gresham, et al.

Respondents argued in their briefing that the Secretary of Health and Human Services’ approval of Medicaid demonstration projects in Arkansas and New Hampshire that conditioned health insurance coverage on satisfying work requirements was arbitrary and capricious, in violation of the Administrative Procedure Act. The Court did not reach that merits question, and instead vacated the judgments in the case on mootness grounds.

Federal Bureau of Investigation v. Fikre, Case No. 22-1178, 144 S.Ct. 771 (2024), co-counsel for Respondent Yonas Fikre

The Supreme Court ruled unanimously in favor of Mr. Fikre, an American citizen who alleged that he had been unconstitutionally put on the No Fly List and stranded overseas for four years. In its decision, the Court held that Mr. Fikre’s civil rights action against the U.S. government could go forward, rejecting the government’s arguments that the case had been mooted by his subsequent removal from the No Fly List and the government’s promise it would not put him on the list “based on the currently available information.”

Indian Child Welfare Act Cases: Haaland v. Brackeen; Cherokee Nation v. Brackeen; Texas v. Haaland; Brackeen v. Haaland, Case Nos. 21-376, 21-377, 21-378, 21-380, 143 S.Ct. 1609 (2023), co-counsel for Respondents Cherokee Nation, Oneida Nation, and Morongo Band of Mission Indians

In a 7-2 opinion, the Supreme Court rejected Petitioners’ many constitutional challenges to the Federal Indian Child Welfare Act (“ICWA”), ruling in favor of the clinic’s clients in the case. ICWA is a federal statute that was passed in 1978 to protect Indian children by installing substantive and procedural guardrails against the unjustified termination of parental rights and removal of Indian children from tribes. The Court rejected all of Petitioners’ challenge to the statute, some on the merits and other for lack of standing. Justice Gorsuch wrote a separate concurrence that further explained the important considerations in this case—from protecting Indian children, to safeguarding tribal sovereignty.

Honeycutt v. United States, Case No. 16-142, 137 S.Ct. 1626 (2017), co-counsel for Petitioner Terry M. Honeycutt

The Supreme Court ruled unanimously in favor of Mr. Honeycutt, holding that federal criminal asset forfeiture statutes apply only to property a defendant actually acquired as the result of the crime, or to substitute property under narrowly defined circumstances. The Court rejected the government’s argument that members of a criminal conspiracy are subject to joint and several liability for forfeiture.

Kokesh v. Securities and Exchange Commission, Case No. 16-529, 137 S.Ct. 1635 (2017), co-counsel for Petitioner Charles R. Kokesh

The Supreme Court ruled unanimously in favor of Mr. Kokesh, holding that the five-year statute of limitations in a general federal statute governing penalties applies to SEC claims seeking disgorgement of illegally obtained profits. The Court rejected the government’s view that there is no statute of limitations applicable to disgorgement claims.

Manuel v. City of Joliet, Case No. 14-9496, 137 S.Ct. 911 (2017), co-counsel for Respondent City of Joliet

The case centered on the relationship between the tort of malicious prosecution and the Fourth Amendment. The Supreme Court majority decision did not reach that question. It instead acknowledged that a Fourth Amendment claim could survive the initiation of legal process in a case, and it remanded the case to the Seventh Circuit to determine the parameters of such a claim—including when it accrues—in the first instance.

Marinello v. United States, Case No. 16-1144, 138 S.Ct. 1101 (2018), co-counsel for Petitioner Carlo J. Marinello II

At issue was the scope of 26 U.S.C. §7212(a), which makes it a felony to “corruptly or by force or threats of force . . . obstruct or impede, or endeavor to obstruct or impede, the due administration” of the Internal Revenue Code. The Supreme Court ruled in favor of Mr. Marinello, holding that this provision requires the federal government to prove the defendant was aware of a pending tax-related proceeding, such as a particular investigation or audit, or could reasonably foresee that such a proceeding would commence.

McDonough v. Smith, Case No. 18-485, 139 S.Ct. 2149 (2019), co-counsel for Respondent Youel Smith

At issue was when a claim for “fabricated evidence” under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 accrued for statute of limitations purposes. The courts below held that the claim was untimely, concluding that the limitations period began to run when the evidence was used. In a 7-2 decision, the Court held that the limitations period did not begin to run until the Petitioner’s acquittal, and therefore reversed.

Nance v. Ward, Case No. 21-439, 142 S.Ct. 2214 (2022), co-counsel for Petitioner Michael Nance

Mr. Nance raised an Eighth Amendment challenge to Georgia’s sole statutorily authorized method of execution, lethal injection. At issue in the case was whether Mr. Nance could bring his method-of-execution claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a federal civil rights law that allows individuals to seek remedies when their constitutional rights are violated. A majority of the Court ruled in favor of Mr. Nance, agreeing that § 1983 was an appropriate procedural vehicle for Mr. Nance’s claim. The case thus confirmed that prisoners have judicial recourse to seek protection from cruel and unusual punishment.

Oklahoma v. Castro-Huerta, Case No. 21-429, 142 S.Ct. 2486 (2022), co-counsel for Respondent Victor Manuel Castro-Huerta

The question presented in this case was whether the federal government and the state of Oklahoma have concurrent jurisdiction to prosecute crimes committed by non-Indians against Indians in Indian country. In a 5-4 majority opinion, the Court ruled in favor of the Petitioner, holding that the federal government and state of Oklahoma have concurrent jurisdiction to prosecute these crimes. Justice Gorsuch filed a dissenting opinion that was joined by Justices Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kagan.

Sharp v. Murphy, Case No. 17-1107, 140 S.Ct. 2412 (2020), co-counsel for Respondent Patrick Dwayne Murphy

The question presented was whether Congress had disestablished the reservation of the Muscogee (Creek) Nation in Oklahoma for purposes of federal criminal law. After briefing and oral argument during the Court’s 2018 Term, the Court held the case for re-argument during its 2019 Term. The Court then took another case (McGirt v. Oklahoma, Case No. 18-9526, 140 S.Ct. 2452 (2020)) raising the same issue during the 2019 Term. In a 5-4 decision in that case, the Court agreed with the position taken by the Clinic in Murphy, holding that these lands remained an Indian reservation for purposes of federal criminal law. The Court then ruled in favor of Mr. Murphy in the Murphy case.

Williams, et al., v. Reed, Case No. 23-191, 145 S.Ct. 465 (2025), counsel for Petitioners

Petitioners were unemployment compensation benefits claimants in Alabama who had experienced delays and other irregularities in the processing of their unemployment compensation benefits claims. In an opinion authored by Justice Kavanaugh, a majority of the Court agreed with Petitioners that they were not required to exhaust administrative remedies before bringing suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 arguing that these delays and irregularities violated due process and federal law. The case establishes an important principle that states cannot create procedural barriers that effectively immunize officials from accountability under federal civil rights laws.

Recent U.S. Supreme Court Amicus Briefs

A.J.T. v. Osseo Area Schools, et al., Case No. 24-249, 145 S.Ct. 1647, amicus curiae brief in support of Petitioner

At issue in this case was whether students bringing claims against their schools for disability discrimination under the Americans with Disabilities Act or the Rehabilitation Act are required to school officials acted with “bad faith or gross misjudgment”—a higher showing than required for disability discrimination claims outside the educational context. Id. The clinic’s amicus brief explained that both the plain language of the statutes at issue and the long history of these statutory schemes make clear that the ADA and Rehabilitation Act do not require this higher showing in the educational context, and that students instead are subject to the same standards that apply in other disability discrimination contexts. In a unanimous opinion authored by Chief Justice Roberts, the Supreme Court agreed with the position taken by the clinic.

Ayestas v. Davis, Case No. 16-6795, 138 S.Ct 1080, amicus curiae brief in support of Petitioner

The Supreme Court unanimously ruled in favor of the position taken by the clinic in the case, holding that the lower court applied the wrong standard in denying the capital habeas petitioner’s request for funding for investigative and expert resources during his federal post-conviction proceedings. The clinic’s brief explained that access to such investigative and expert resources during federal post-conviction proceedings is often essential to vindicating a meritorious claim and avoiding the imposition of an unconstitutional death sentence. 

Endrew F. v. Douglas County School District, Case No. 15-827, 137 S.Ct. 988, amicus curiae brief in support of Petitioner

A majority of the Supreme Court ruled in favor of the position taken by the clinic in the case, holding that the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act requires a school to offer an individualized education program reasonably calculated to enable a child to make progress appropriate in light of the child’s circumstances. The clinic’s brief argued that this Act was meant to “consistently and clearly” raise expectations for the quality of education provided to students with disabilities.

United States v. Hansen, Case No. 22-179, 143 S.Ct. 1932, amicus curiae brief in support of Respondent

At issue in this case was whether a federal law that prohibits “encourag[ing] or induc[ing]” illegal immigration, 8 U.S.C. §1324(a)(1)(A)(iv), criminalizes protected speech in violation of the First Amendment. The clinic’s amicus brief explained that this statute required religious organizations providing charitable services to either turn away those in need based on immigration status, cease to perform certain charity and advocacy work entirely, or face the realistic possibility of criminal prosecution. Justice Jackson’s dissent cited the clinic’s amicus brief for the proposition that this statute can plainly chill speech.

Janus v. American Federation of State, County, and Municipal Employees, Council 31, Case No. 16-1466, 138 S.Ct. 2448, amicus curiae brief in support of Respondents

At issue was whether the Supreme Court should overrule its prior precedent and hold that Illinois’ public-sector “agency shop” arrangement violated the First Amendment. The clinic’s amicus brief argued that doing so would undermine one of the most important vehicles for providing economic and professional opportunities for workers in the United States—and, in particular, for workers who are women and people of color. In a 5-4 decision, the Supreme Court overruled its prior precedent and held that Illinois’ “agency shop” arrangement violated the First Amendment. 

Kahler v. Kansas, Case No. 18-6135, 140 S.Ct. 1021, amicus curiae brief on behalf of Petitioner

The question presented is whether the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments permit a state to abolish the insanity defense. The clinic’s amicus brief argued that abolition of the insanity defense is incompatible with the Anglo-American legal tradition and with commonly accepted rationales for punishment. A majority of the Court held that due process does not compel the acquittal of a defendant who, because of mental illness when committing his crime, could not tell right from wrong when committing his crime.

Pena-Rodriguez v. Colorado, Case No. 15-606, 137 S.Ct. 855, amicus curiae brief in support of Petitioner

A majority of the Supreme Court ruled in favor of the position taken by the clinic in the case, holding that when a juror makes a clear statement indicating that he or she relied on racial stereotypes or animus to convict a criminal defendant, a rule prohibiting jurors from impeaching their verdicts must yield to the Sixth Amendment, so that the trial court can consider the evidence of the juror's statement and any resulting Sixth Amendment violation. The clinic’s amicus brief explained that there is a long history of allowing jurors to impeach their verdicts to ensure fairness.

Perez v. Sturgis Public Schools, Case No. 21-887, 143 S.Ct. 859, amicus curiae brief in support of Petitioner

At issue in this case was the extent to which children with disabilities must exhaust administrative procedures under the Individuals with Disabilities in Education Act before seeking relief under other federal antidiscrimination statutes, such as the Americans with Disabilities Act. The clinic’s amicus brief explained that plain language and legislative history of the IDEA make clear that its exhaustion requirements are narrow ones—and do not require exhaustion when the relief sought is unavailable under the IDEA. In a unanimous opinion by Justice Gorsuch, the Supreme Court agreed with the position taken by the clinic.

Pugin v. Garland; Garland v. Cordero-Garcia, Case Nos. 22-23 and 22-331, 143 S.Ct. 1833, amicus curiae brief in support of Mr. Pugin and Mr. Cordero-Garcia

Federal law provides that noncitizens are removable from the United States if convicted of an “aggravated felony,” defined to include an offense “relating to obstruction of justice.” See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(S). At issue in these cases was whether “relating to obstruction of justice” requires some nexus to some pending investigation or proceeding. The clinic’s amicus brief explained that the government’s broad reading of this statute would sweep in a wide range of conduct that is not obstruction of justice, not aggravated, and not a felony. Justice Sotomayor’s dissenting opinion cited the clinic’s amicus brief.

The American Legion v. American Humanist Association, Case Nos. 17-1717, 18-18, 139 S.Ct. 2067, amicus curiae brief in support of Respondent

At issue in the case was whether the government violated the Establishment Clause by maintaining a 40-foot-tall Latin Cross as a memorial to those who gave their lives for the United States in World War I. The clinic’s amicus brief argued that the Latin Cross does not commemorate or honor the sacrifice of Jewish soldiers who, with equal devotion, gave their lives for the country. The clinic’s brief was cited in a concurring opinion and a dissenting opinion in the case.

Trump v. Hawaii, et al., Case No. 17-965, 138 S.Ct. 2392, amicus curiae brief in support of Respondents

At issue was Presidential Proclamation 9645, sometimes referred to as the “travel ban.” The clinic’s amicus brief responded to the government’s argument that the respondents’ challenge was unreviewable by the courts. As the clinic’s brief explained, the history of the doctrine of consular non-reviewability and the Supreme Court’s cases demonstrate that the courts have consistently been open for these sorts of claims—and holding them unreviewable therefore would represent a marked and unwarranted change in the law. In its 5-4 ruling in the case, the Supreme Court declined to rule on this issue, assuming without deciding for purposes of the opinion that the respondents’ claims were reviewable.

United States v. Sineneng-Smith, Case No. 19-67, 140 S.Ct. 1575, amicus curiae brief in support of Respondent

At issue in the case was whether the federal criminal prohibition against encouraging or inducing illegal immigration for commercial advantage or private financial gain, in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(1)(A)(iv) and (B)(i), is facially unconstitutional. The clinic’s amicus brief explained that the government has used this prohibition to interfere with and chill a substantial amount of protected speech along the southern border. The Supreme Court did not reach the constitutional question in the case. Instead, in a unanimous opinion, the Court vacated the appellate court decision and remanded the case, holding that the appeals panel departed so drastically from the principle of party presentation as to constitute an abuse of discretion.

Recent Seventh Circuit Cases

Pennewell v. Parish, et al., counsel for Plaintiff-Appellant James Vern Pennewell

Mr. Pennewell entered prison blind in one eye, and then became legally blind in his other eye while incarcerated. He claimed that prison medical providers were deliberately indifferent to his medical needs—including treatment for a detached retina—in violation of the Eighth Amendment. On appeal, the clinic argued that the district court erred in refusing to recruit counsel for Mr. Pennewell (who proceeded pro se throughout the district court proceedings) and in granting summary judgment to the defendants. The Seventh Circuit vacated the judgment and remanded the case with instructions to recruit counsel for Mr. Pennewell. In its published opinion, the Seventh Circuit explained that the district court abused its discretion in holding that, based on his adequate pleadings, Mr. Pennewell was competent to litigate the case without counsel.