The 2017 Dewey Lecture in Law and Philosophy featuring Henry Shue

11/8

Wednesday, November 8, 2017 @ 4:00pm2017-11-08 16:00:00 2017-11-08 16:00:00 The 2017 Dewey Lecture in Law and Philosophy featuring Henry Shue 1111 East 60th Street, Chicago, Illinois 60637 University of Chicago Law School willcanderson@uchicago.edu America/Chicago public -
Weymouth Kirkland Courtroom

The Dewey Lecture in Law and Philosophy featuring Leslie Green: "Right Speech"

11/9

Wednesday, November 9, 2016 @ 4:00pm2016-11-09 16:00:00 2016-11-09 16:00:00 The Dewey Lecture in Law and Philosophy featuring Leslie Green: "Right Speech"  Freedom of speech protects speech that is, for example, offensive.  But having the right to offend does not give anyone a reason to offend others.   How we should speak is a matter for the norms that govern speaking, not the norms that govern responses to speaking.  It is a matter of what it is right to do, not a matter of what rights we have.  So: what norms should govern us in speaking?  Most Western traditions give little attention to this, apart from the prohibition on lying.  Classical Buddhist thought, in contrast, offers a well-developed doctrine of ‘right speech’.  In this Lecture, Professor Green will explore that doctrine, give it a partial defense, and suggest ways that right speech can and should be supported while remaining faithful to the principles of free speech. - University of Chicago Law School willcanderson@uchicago.edu America/Chicago public

Dewey Lecture: Three Concepts of Human Dignity - Moshe Halbertal

11/11

Wednesday, November 11, 2015 @ 4:00pm2015-11-11 16:00:00 2015-11-11 16:00:00 Dewey Lecture: Three Concepts of Human Dignity - Moshe Halbertal Human Dignity has become a central value in political and constitutional thought. Yet its meaning and scope, and its relation to other moral and political values such as autonomy and rights have been elusive. The lecture will explicate the value of Human Dignity through the exploration of three distinct ways in which dignity is violated.Moshe Halbertal, Gruss Professor of Law at NYU, Professor of Philosophy Hebrew University - University of Chicago Law School willcanderson@uchicago.edu America/Chicago public

Three, Not Two, Concepts of Liberty - Dewey Lecture with Axel Honneth

11/12

Wednesday, November 12, 2014 @ 4:00pm2014-11-12 16:00:00 2014-11-12 16:00:00 Three, Not Two, Concepts of Liberty - Dewey Lecture with Axel Honneth Reception follows.Even for those among us who are not altogether convinced by Isaiah Berlin's famous essay "Two Concepts of Liberty," it has by now become commonplace to adopt a distinction between "negative" and "positive" liberties that largely coincides with the one he offered. In my lecture I defend the thesis that this bifurcation of the concept of freedom is incomplete in a significant respect, because it omits a third type, which I will call "social freedom." I proceed first by illustrating with some well-known examples how we must understand this third form of freedom, which cannot be performed by one subject alone, but rather requires the cooperation of others. In the second step I want to recall briefly the philosophical tradition in which this idea of "social freedom" has always had a central place. Finally, I delve into the systematic question of whether the suggested model of freedom in fact designates a third concept, which does not conform to the traditional bifurcated understanding. - University of Chicago Law School willcanderson@uchicago.edu America/Chicago public

Dewey Lecture in Law & Philosophy: Barbara Herman (UCLA, Philosophy and Law)

2/26

Wednesday, February 26, 2014 @ 4:00pm2014-02-26 16:00:00 2014-02-26 16:00:00 Dewey Lecture in Law & Philosophy: Barbara Herman (UCLA, Philosophy and Law) Featured Speaker: Professor Barbara Herman, UCLAThe Moral Side of Non-negligence Legal discussions of negligence focus on issues of harm, fault, and remedy in the context of failure to exercise reasonable care.  The point of orientation is the negligent event.  In this talk I want to investigate a related moral duty, the duty of due care.  Its orientation is ex ante; it is an imperfect duty that ranges across private and public morality; its content is not restricted to injury and loss.  The wrongful failure of due care need not increase the risk of a negligent event.  An agent acting negligently in the moral sense has failed to take on the full burden of some other duty.  The argument for this view of due care will lend support to three more general theses: about the nature and importance of imperfect duties, about the primacy of non-negligence, and about the rationale for different schemes of remedy on the legal side. - University of Chicago Law School willcanderson@uchicago.edu America/Chicago public