The Employment Law Clinic focuses primarily on pre-trial litigation and handles a number of individual cases and class actions. In individual cases, the Clinic represents clients in cases before the Illinois Department of Human Rights and the Illinois Human Rights Commission and seeks to obtain relief for clients from race, sex, national origin, and handicap discrimination in the work place. In the class actions, the Clinic represents groups of employees in employment and civil rights actions in federal court. Additionally, in its individual cases and law reform/impact cases, the Clinic seeks to improve the procedures and remedies available to victims of employment discrimination so that employees have a fair opportunity to present their claims in a reasonably expeditious way. Clinical Professor Randall D. Schmidt is the director of the Clinic. The Clinic's significant accomplishments for 2024-25 appear below.  

During the past academic year, the Employment Law Clinic has continued its work helping pro se plaintiffs in employment discrimination cases in federal court. This work includes representing pro se plaintiffs as their Settlement Assistance Counsel in individual discrimination cases and representing pro se plaintiffs in their appeals in the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals. In addition, the Employment Law Clinic has expanded its work with pro se plaintiffs by participating in the William J. Hibbler Memorial Pro Se Assistance Program. This program allows students in the Employment Law Clinic to provide pro se plaintiffs with advice about procedural issues in their cases pending in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois. Some of the significant developments in a few of the Clinic’s cases are detailed below. 

Settlement Assistance Cases

Clinical Professor Randall D. Schmidt and his students are appointed on a regular basis to provide representation to pro se plaintiffs at settlement conferences. Since starting this project in early 2021, Professor Schmidt has been appointed as Settlement Assistance Counsel for pro se plaintiffs in twenty-nine employment discrimination cases. Although most of these cases were pending in the Eastern Division of the Northern District of Illinois, he has also been appointed in cases pending the Western Division of the Northern District of Illinois and in the Central District of Illinois. 

These cases allow students to interview the client, research the legal and factual issues in the case, draft a settlement demand letter, represent the client at a settlement conference, and, if the case settles, draft the settlement agreement. 

Professor Schmidt and his students have been very successful in resolving these cases. Of the twenty-nine cases Professor Schmidt and his students have handled, nineteen were settled after one of more mediation sessions. Four are still pending awaiting the initial or follow-up settlement conference. Six cases did not settle. Of those, one settled before trial (after Professor Schmidt’s appointment ended), three are still pending, and summary judgment was granted in favor of the defendant in the other two.

Below are a few examples of cases that Professor Schmidt and his students handled during the 2024-25 academic year. Each of these cases resulted in a settlement after one or more mediation sessions. Pursuant to the settlement agreements in these lawsuits, the details of the settlements are confidential. 

Glenn v. Allied University Security, No. 1:24-cv-06200 (Settled 04/15/25)

Allied Universal Security ("Allied") is a private security staffing company and the world's largest provider of private security guards. Shanika Glenn is an African American woman who began working at Allied in December 2021. Until her resignation on February 6, 2023, Ms. Glenn was employed as a Shift Supervisor at Allied. During her time as an employee at Allied, Ms. Glenn claimed that she experienced unlawful discrimination on the basis of her race, sex, and color. Ms. Glenn also alleged that she experienced unlawful discrimination based on her pregnancy and pregnancy-related disability. Finally, Ms. Glenn asserted that Allied retaliated against her when she complained about the discrimination.

Ms. Glenn filed a pro se complaint alleging that Allied violated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. (“Title VII”), the Civil Rights Act of 1866, 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (“§ 1981”), and the Illinois Human Rights Act, 775 ILCS 5/1-101 et seq. ((“IHRA”). Ms. Glenn also alleged that Allied violated Title VII, as amended by the Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1990, and the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12111, 12112 (“ADA”).

Shortly after the case was filed, the court appointed Professor Schmidt as Ms. Glenn’s Settlement Assistance Counsel. A settlement conference as held before Magistrate Judge Laura K. McNally. The parties were able to reach a settlement during the settlement conference and the case was dismissed.

Haynes v. United Parcel Service, Inc., No. 1:23-cv-16739) (N.D. Ill.) (Settled 06/03/25)

United Parcel Service (UPS), a multinational shipping and receiving company, employed Airelle Haynes, an African American woman, as a regular employee and then a supervisor at its CACH facility in Hodgkins, Illinois, from September 2020 to March 2022. During her employment, UPS subjected Ms. Haynes to a hostile work environment based on her race and sex, including sexual harassments, racial insults, and retaliatory actions after she reported the misconduct. 

Ms. Haynes filed a pro se complaint alleging that UPS engaged in unlawful discrimination in violation of Title VII, the IHRA, and Illinois Whistleblower Act, 740 ILCS 174/20-30. After the parties had conducted extensive discovery, the court appointed Professor Schmidt as Settlement Assistance Counsel for Ms. Haynes. A settlement conference was conducted by Magistrate Judge Young B. Kim. At the settlement conference, the parties were able to reach a settlement and the case was dismissed.

Kayossi v. BMO Harris Bank, No. 1:23-cv-03170 (Settled 01/22/25)

Oyeto-Ola Brice Armel Kayossi has a disability that is controlled by medication. Unfortunately, the medication occasionally causes Mr. Kayossi to lose consciousness. A placement agency placed Mr. Kayossi with BMO Harris Bank, North America (“BMO”) as a Bilingual French/English Fraud Analyst. His initial placement was for six months but his position would become permanent after the initial six-month period.

On March 14, 2022, Mr. Kayossi arrived at the BMO office for his first day. Mr. Kayossi commenced training for his position until he was interrupted by the side effects of his medication, which he was taking because of an underlying medical condition. In the first “episode,” and he lost consciousness. He regained consciousness and continued with the training. A second “episode” followed, whereupon he was asked by another colleague what happened. Mr. Kayossi explained that he had taken his prescribed medications that cause dizziness, but he did not want to disclose his medical condition to anybody other than a supervisor. Mr. Kayossi resumed his work. 

At the end of the day, a supervisor told him to come back early the next day. He was led to believe that he would be given a new desk. However, after he arrived at home, and before he had been given the opportunity to explain his disability and discuss reasonable accommodations with BMO, he received notice that he was discharged. 

Mr. Kayossi filed a pro se complaint alleging that BMO violated the ADA. In particular, Mr. Kayossi claimed that BMO discriminated against him based on his disability and that although he requested an accommodation, BMO failed to engage in the interactive process to determine what accommodations would be appropriate, violating the ADA.

A settlement conference was conducted by Magistrate Judge Jeannice W. Appenteng. The parties were able to reach a settlement during the settlement conference and the case was dismissed.

Lewis v. Echo Global Logistics, Inc., No. 1:24-cv-04098 (Settled 11/19/24)

Jeremy Lewis alleged that his former employer Echo Global Logistics, Inc. discriminated against him due to his race (Black) and disability (PTSD, anxiety, and depression) by failing to stop harassment. Mr. Lewis was hired by Echo in April 2021 and he worked as an account manager. He claimed that Echo failed to accommodate his disability, failed to promote him and wrongfully terminated his employment. More specifically, Mr. Lewis’s supervisor made overtly racist remarks to him. Mr. Lewis brought this issue to the attention of Echo’s Human Resources Department but his complaints were not addressed. Instead, Echo retaliated against Mr. Lewis, exacerbating his disability symptoms. Echo discharged Mr. Lewis on September 15, 2022. 

Mr. Lewis filed a pro se complaint alleging that Echo engaged in unlawful discrimination based on his race in violation of Title VII, § 1981, and the IHRA. He also claimed that Echo discriminated against him based on his disabilities and, although he requested accommodations, failed to engage in the interactive process to determine what accommodations would be appropriate, violating the ADA. 

Magistrate Judge Honorable Keri L. Holleb Hotaling conducted an in-person settlement conference. At that conference, the parties were able to reach a settlement and the case was dismissed.

Miller v. Davis Staffing, No. 1:22-cv-05975 (Settled 12/10/24)

Davis Staffing, a Chicago-based staffing agency that specializes in industrial staffing services, hired Joel D. Miller in 2022. Subsequently, Davis Staffing assigned him to a position at Griffith Foods. While working there, Mr. Miller was significantly older than all other similarly situated employees. Shortly after placing Mr. Miller at Griffith Foods, Davis Staffing stopped the assignment. Davis Staffing filed to explain to Mr. Miller why it stopped the assignment. Mr. Miller believed that Davis Staffing ended his placement because of his age. 

Mr. Miller brought his pro se lawsuit against Davis Staffing and alleged that its termination and failure to promote him violated the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 621 et seq.(“ADEA”). After some initial discovery, the parties agreed to participate in a settlement conference. The court appointed Professor Schmidt as Settlement Assistance Counsel for Mr. Lewis.

A settlement conference was conducted by Magistrate Judge Maria Valdez. The parties were able to reach a settlement during the settlement conference and the case was dismissed.

Rosas v. Planta River North, LLC., No. 1:24-cv-08695 (Settled 04/10/25)

Planta River North, LLC, (“Planta”) is a vegan fine dining restaurant located in Chicago’s River North. Irma Rosas began employment with Planta as a pastry cook on September 10, 2022.  Ms. Rosas, who is Hispanic, began to experience discrimination within two weeks of her start date. In particular, a non-Hispanic worker stated to Ms. Rosas: then stated, “It’s like in America we speak English not Spanish. A lot of people come here and they don’t learn English … it’s like when you go to Chinatown and I see all the scribbles. I can’t read that. No one can be treated special until my people are. Don’t you know history?” 

Minutes after this encounter, Ms. Rosas reported the incident to a Planta corporate administrator and her immediate supervisor. But instead of disciplining the employee who made the comment, Planta’s management moved Ms. Rosas to an undesirable workstation and reduced her hours. The situation being intolerable, she left the job.  

Subsequently, Ms. Rosas filed a pro se complaint alleging that Planta violated Title VII by (1) creating a hostile work environment through her co-worker’s racial remarks and (2) retaliating against Ms. Rosas for reporting such incident. After some initial discovery, the parties agreed to a settlement Conference. The court appointed Professor Schmidt as Settlement Assistance Counsel for Ms. Rosas.

The parties participated in a settlement conference before Magistrate Judge Heather McShain. The parties reached a settlement at the conference. Unfortunately for Ms. Rosas, Planta filed for bankruptcy before the settlement could be effectuated. Thus, the case has been stayed by the bankruptcy court and Ms. Rosas has submitted a claim in that proceeding.

Vasquez v. City of Chicago, No. 1:19-cv-6014 (Settled 05/16/25)

Mr. Vasquez seeks redress from the City of Chicago under Title VII and the Family and Medical Leave Act (“FMLA”), for its discriminatory and retaliatory conduct toward him. Mr. Vasquez timely filed his initial complaint after receiving his right-to-sue letter from the EEOC, on September 6, 2019. In his Fourth Amended Complaint, Mr. Vasquez alleges both national origin discrimination and retaliation for reporting said discrimination.

Raul Vasquez began work at Chicago’s Police Department (“CPD”) on September 1, 2010. He worked without incident until 2014. In 2014, Mr. Vasquez’s superiors began subjecting him to ethnic discrimination and retaliation. The treatment began when a superior officer told another officer, while looking directly at Mr. Vasquez, "put these God-damn Mexicans in the 30 sector!" (Sector 30 is the least desirable work assignment in the district Mr. Vasquez was assigned to.). Mr. Vasquez found those comments discriminatory and complained about them internally to the CPD EEO Officer. That EEO complaint precipitated a long series of retaliatory actions against Mr. Vasquez.

Mr. Vasquez filed a pro se complaint seeking redress from the City of Chicago under Title VII and the Family and Medical Leave Act (“FMLA”). In the Title VII portion of his complaint, Mr. Vasquez alleged both national origin discrimination and retaliation for reporting said discrimination.

The parties engaged in years of discovery. After discovery was almost complete, they agreed to attend a settlement conference prior to the City filing a motion for summary judgment. At that point, the court appointed Professor Schmidt as Settlement Assistance Counsel for Mr. Vasquez

A settlement conference was conducted by Magistrate Judge Jeannice W. Appenteng. The parties were able to reach a settlement during the settlement conference and the case was dismissed.

William J. Hibbler Memorial Pro Se Assistance Program

In early 2024, the Employment Law Clinic expanded its work with pro se litigants by participating in the William J. Hibbler Memorial Pro Se Assistance Program (“Hibler Help Desk”). The Hibbler Help Desk is administered by the People’s Law Center in cooperation with the District Court and the Chicago Bar Foundation. It is “staffed” by volunteer attorneys. The program serves pro se litigants in civil cases filed or to be filed in the federal court for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern and Western Divisions. A Program attorney provides pro se litigants with limited legal assistance with their cases. In particular, the Hibbler Help Desk provides pro se litigants with help on procedural issues, not substantive legal advice. 

Since the Employment Law Clinic began helping pro se litigants, students in the Clinic have met with and assisted more than forty pro se litigants. The support we have provided includes helping clients complete the documents needed to file a pro se employment discrimination complaint; providing guidance on submitting Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(a) initial disclosures, written discovery requests and responses; help in complying with the NDIL’s rules regarding motions to compel discovery; explaining the status of the pro se’s case or appeal; referring clients to resources that could assist them with the substantive legal issues in their cases; and referring pro se’s other providers of civil legal services or to social service agencies. 

Appellate Cases

The Employment Law Clinic represents clients in a number of appeals in the US Court Appeals for the Seventh Circuit. In some of these appeals, the Employment Law Clinic represents the appellants in their appeals. In other appeals, the Clinic is contacted and asked to participate as amicus curiae. Students working on these appeals write the briefs and present oral argument to the Seventh Circuit. Both Professor Schmidt and Lecturer-in-Law James Whitehead supervise the students in the appeals pending in the Seventh Circuit. 

Ballard v. Ameren Illinois, Appeal No. 25-1562 (7th Cir.)

Kimberly Ballard was hired by Ameren Illinois on August 12, 2013, as an energy efficiency advisor. On February 9, 2015, while attending a work-related conference, she fell and injured her wrist. Ibid. In February and July 2015, she underwent surgeries to address the injury, but it never fully healed. Thereafter, Ameren repeatedly discriminated against Ms. Ballard because of her physical disability.

Ms. Ballard reported her harassment to Ameren’s management, but the discrimination continued. In retaliation for raising her concerns, she was given negative performance reviews and was criticized by her supervisors. The discrimination against Ms. Ballard culminated in her discharge from Ameren’s employment on February 26, 2018.

On August 24, 2018, Ms. Ballard timely submitted a Complainant Information Sheet (“CIS”) to the Illinois Department of Human Rights (“IDHR”) in which she alleged discrimination and retaliation that she had suffered at Ameren because of her physical disability. In her CIS, she requested the IDHR to investigate her allegations and to cross-file her claims with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”), and  authorized the EEOC to “look into the discrimination alleged [in her CIS].”.

On May 14, 2024, Ms. Ballard, filed a complaint against Ameren in the U.S. District Court for the Central District of Illinois, alleging that she had been discriminated and retaliated against by Ameren because of her disability in violation of the ADA. On July 29, 2024, Ameren filed a Motion to Dismiss Ms. Ballard’s complaint under F. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), arguing inter alia that she had failed to timely exhaust her administrative remedies because she had filed her charge with the EEOC more than 300 days after the date on which she had been discharged by the company.

On January 7, 2025, the district court issued its Order & Opinion dismissing Ms. Ballard’s complaint with prejudice. The court agreed with Ameren that Ms. Ballard’s CIS had not qualified as a charge for the purposes of the ADA, relying solely on the Seventh Circuit’s decision in this Court’s decision in  Carlson v. Christian Bros. Servs., 840 F.3d 466 (7th Cir. 2016), in which the Seventh Circuit had ruled that a filing like the IDHR’s CIS does not function as a charge unless it seeks relief. The court ignored the U.S. Supreme Court’s opinion in Federal Express Corp. v. Holowecki, 552 US. 389 (2008), in which the Supreme Court ruled that an informal pre-charge document filed with the EEOC qualifies as a “charge” for purposes of the limitations periods in federal antidiscrimination statutes if the document (1) alleges discrimination, (2) names the charged party, and (3) requests the agency to take remedial action. 

At Ms. Ballard’s request, the Employment Law Clinic agreed to represent her in her appeal of the dismissal of her complaint. In the appeal, the Clinic is arguing that Carlson misapplied the Supreme Court’s decision in Holowecki and is inconsistent with decisions issued by other circuit courts and dozens of district courts that have concluded that informal filings that contain the same language as the CIS qualify as charges.

The matter is being briefed and oral argument has not yet been scheduled. 

Bell v. DeJoy, Appeal No. 24-1478 (7th Cir.)

Mary Bell is currently working for the United States Post Office (“Postal Service”). On November 22, 2022, Ms. Bell filed her pro se Complaint alleging that the Postal Service discriminated against her with respect to overtime pay and by refusing to downgrade her position. In response, the Postal Service moved to dismiss the complaint, in part, because Ms. Bell had not received a right-to-sue letter from the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission before filing her complaint. Thus, according to the Postal Service, Ms. Bell’s complaint was premature. Contrary to the Postal Service’s motion, Ms. Bell had in fact received a right-to-sue letter from the EEOC after filing her complaint and prior to the Postal Service’s filing of its motion to dismiss. This fact was not brought to the court’s attention, even though the Postal Service had received a copy of the right-to-sue letter, the court agreed and dismissed the complaint. 

The Employment Law Clinic decided to submit an amicus brief in support of Ms. Bell because this case presented several issues of significant importance to the rights of individuals to pursue federal employment discrimination claims in court. In particular, the Employment Law Clinic argued that the district court incorrectly dismissed Ms. Bell’s claims because she had not filed an Amended Complaint raising the claims within ninety days of her receipt of a right-to-sue letter. The court, however, ignored the fact that she had raised the claims in her prematurely filed complaint before receiving the right-to-sue letter. In so doing, the district court disregarded the Seventh Circuit’s settled law that her receipt of the right-to-sue letter before the dismissal of her complaint had cured the Complaint’s premature filing. 

On December 3, 2024, the Seventh Circuit issued an Order vacating the judgment and remanding the case for further proceedings. The Court concluded that the district court erred in dismissing Ms. Bell’s complaint based on a failure to exhaust her administrative remedies. In its order, the Court reaffirmed its holdings in prior cases that receipt of a right-to-sue notice “cures” a prematurely filed complaint.

Thomas v. JBS Green Bay, Appeal No. 24-1404 (7th Cir.)

Miko Thomas works for JBS Green Bay, one of the world’s largest meat producers. His complaint alleged that his employer discriminated against him due to his color with respect to several terms and conditions of his employment, in violation of Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act. Relying on the Seventh Circuit’s standard for establishing justiciable adverse employment actions in discrimination cases, the district court dismissed Mr. Thomas’s Complaint and Amended Complaint. The court concluded that the actions he complained of were not “materially adverse” as a matter of law. 

Mr. Thomas appealed and asked the Employment Law Clinic to represent him in his appeal. The Employment Law agreed to do so because of its interest in clarifying what adverse actions are actionable under Title VII, the ADA and other anti-discrimination statutes. 

After the Employment Law Clinic agreed to represent Mr. Thomas, and six weeks after the district court’s final decision in Mr. Thomas’s case, the U.S. Supreme Court, on April 17, 2024, issued its opinion in Muldrow v. City of St. Louis, 601 U.S. ___, 144 S. Ct 967 (2024). As the Employment Law Clinic predicted, the Court held that, although an employee must show some harm in order to prevail in a Title VII discrimination suit, an employee does not need to show that the injury satisfies a heightened significance test or was “materially adverse.” In doing so, the Court mentions Seventh Circuit precedent as an example of courts using an incorrect standard for determining what actions constitutes adverse action for purposes of Title VII. Thus, the primary issue in Thomas is whether the district court erred in dismissing Mr. Thomas’s case in light of the Supreme Court’s opinion in Muldrow. 

The case was argued by Rex Dyches (’25), a 3L Student in the Employment Law Clinic, on October 29, 2024. On November 8, 2024, the Seventh Circuit issued its Opinion reversing and remanding the case. The Court recognized under Muldrow and F. R. Civ. P. 8, the allegations in Mr. Thomas’s complaint were sufficient to state a cause of action and that the case needed to move forward to discovery.

Harris v. Vision Energy LLC, Appeal No. C-2300406 (Ohio Ct. App.)

The Employment Law Clinic is frequently requested to submit amicus briefs in cases in pending before the Illinois Supreme Court, the Illinois Court of Appeals, and appellate courts in other jurisdictions. In late 2023, the Employment Law Clinic was asked to submit an amicus brief concerning the history of the Illinois Wage Payment and Collections Act (“IWPCA”) in Harris v. Vision. The Employment Law Clinic previously submitted a similar brief in Johnson v. Diakon Logistics, 44 F.3d 1048 (7th Cir. 2022). 

In Harris, Jeff Harris, a resident of Ohio, worked for Vision Energy, an Ohio company. All of the work Mr. Harris provided to Vision took place in Illinois. In exchange for Mr. Harris’s labor, Vision promised him, among other compensation, a four percent equity interest in a yet-to-be-formed corporation. When Vision failed to pay him the value of the promised equity interest, Mr. Harris filed a complaint against Vision in Ohio to recover that sum under the IWPCA. Vision moved to dismiss Mr. Harris’ IWPCA claim based on a choice-of-law provision in the parties’ contract, which stated that the agreement was to be governed by Ohio law. The court granted Vision’s motion and dismissed the IWPCA claim. 

Mr. Harris appealed the court’s dismissal of his IWPCA claim and his counsel requested that the Employment Law Clinic submit a brief explaining the history and strong public policy behind the IWPCA. The Employment Law Clinic agreed to do so and submitted an amicus brief on behalf of Mr. Harris. 

In the amicus brief, the Employment Law Clinic argues that the history of the IWPCA and Illinois’s prior wage-theft statutes demonstrates the importance that the Illinois legislature has placed on protecting its workers and the centrality of preventing wage theft to Illinois’s public policy. The amicus brief also demonstrates that Illinois has a materially greater interest than Ohio in the resolution of the dispute because Mr. Harris performed all his work for Vision in Illinois. The lower court’s decision that requires Mr. Harris to bring his wage theft claim against Vision under Ohio’s wage laws, is manifestly repugnant to the fundamental policies of Illinois because Ohio’s wage protection laws would not have provided him with a viable claim or with any remedy for the work he performed solely in Illinois.

Finally, the Employment Law Clinic argued that the choice-of-law provision in the Harris-Vision Agreement did not override the territorial limitations of Ohio’s wage protection statutes, which do not apply extraterritorially to work performed exclusively outside of Ohio. Courts across the country, including Ohio courts, have long recognized that a state’s territorial limitations apply even when that state’s law is selected for application by a choice-of-law provision. 

On July 31, 2024, the Ohio First District Court of Appeals issued its opinion and reversed the lower court’s order dismissal of Mr. Harris’s IWPCA claims. Relying in part on the Seventh Circuit’s decision in Diakon and the arguments raised in the Clinic’s amicus brief, the Court held that the parties contractual choice of Ohio law provision could not control because applying it would be contrary to a fundamental policy of Illinois, which had a greater material interest than Ohio in determining whether Mr. Harris’s work in Illinois was protected by wage laws.

On November 26, 2024, the Ohio Supreme Court denied Vision’s request that it review the decision of the Court of Appeals.