As explained in this post from last week, Alison Siegler, Clinical Professor of Law and Director of the University of Chicago Law School's Federal Criminal Justice Clinic, wrote to me to highlight a big Seventh Circuit ruling on the Bail Reform Act (BRA).  I suggested that she do a guest post series on this Wilks ruling (as she previously did a series of guest posts on her stash-house sting litigation).  Alison  prepared two  posts on the topic; the first is at this link, the second is here:

The Wilks opinion is groundbreaking not only for its clarification of the BRA’s presumption of detention, but also because it is the first opinion from the Seventh Circuit to address the standard of review for a revocation decision under 18 U.S.C. § 3148.  The court sets the same standard of review for both an initial detention decision under 18 U.S.C. § 3142 and a revocation decision under § 3148: “‘independent review’ of the decision below, though with deference to the judge’s findings of historical fact and his greater familiarity with the defendant and the case.” United States v. Wilks, 15 F.4th 842, 847 (7th Cir. 2021); id. (“We conclude that the same standard of review governs an appeal from an initial detention decision and a decision to revoke pretrial release.” (emphasis in original)).

Moreover, Wilks is also the first Seventh Circuit case to address the legal standard for revocation of pretrial release in 18 U.S.C § 3148 (a different issue from the standard of review).  The court holds, in relevant part: “A finding that the defendant violated a release condition does not alone permit revocation; the judge must make findings under both § 3148(b)(1) and (b)(2) before he may revoke release” and must also “weigh the factors listed in § 3142(g).” Id. at 848.

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