Remarks from the Law School's 2011 Hooding Ceremony on June 11, 2011. Speakers included Dean Michael Schill, Debra Cafaro, '82 (recipient of the Distinguished Alumna Award), and Professor Douglas Baird.
What is a tiebreaker? Are some tiebreakers better than others? Does law have tiebreakers? Are ties so terrible that we need to break them? In this CBI, Professor Samaha offers answers to these questions. Using various examples from life and law, he will explain how tiebreakers can be thought of as a peculiar sort of lexically inferior decision rule.
Commentators criticized the Bush administration for expanding presidential powers, but the Obama administration has not tried to curtail them, nor has Congress or the courts. In this talk, Professor Posner will trace the evolution of the imperial presidency, and explain why the powerful executive has become entrenched in the U.S. system of government.
Among the disturbing reports from a variety of venues at which the U.S. military has conducted interrogations of Islamic male detainees are those detailing exploitation of sexual and gender stereotypes and taboos as a central part of efforts to humiliate and degrade detainees.
It is widely believed today that the free market is the best mechanism ever invented to efficiently allocate resources in society. Just as fundamental is the belief that government has a legitimate and competent role in policing and punishing. The result, in this country, has been an incendiary combination of laissez faire and mass incarceration.
This panel was recorded April 24, 2010 as part of the conference "Creating Capabilities," held at the University of Chicago Law School and organized by James Heckman, Martha Nussbaum and Robert Pollak.
Patents encourage innovation by granting inventors exclusive rights to sell their inventions. The resulting monopoly profits are a reward for innovation. It is commonly thought, however, that these monopoly profits price some consumers of inventions out of the market. This loss of consumption is an “efficiency” cost of patents.