Students may have different interests in terms of reading before and after each lecture. I suggest that at a minimum everyone read the cited Wikipedia pages, as they introduce concepts and ensure familiarity with English language expressions for various concepts. The syllabus also offers suggested readings, and then readings associated with each Day’s lecture, but these can wait.

Day 1
What is public choice? Participation, aggregation, interest groups, and wisdom of crowds
Wasted votes versus waste in markets; efficiency in markets and voting.
Spatial competition and voting
Median voter
Condorcet’s voting paradox as a precursor to Arrow’s Theorem
The voting paradox and game theory

Wikipedia pages:
Median voter theorem
Single transferable vote
Revelation principle (mechanism design)
Location model (spatial competition)
Condorcet paradox

Day 2
Cycling paradoxes in law
Can groups have intent?
Condorcet Jury Theorem
Judges and lawmakers over time: preferences, right answers, and inconsistencies
Winner’s curse
Second opinions
Optimal stopping theory added in to the analysis

Wikipedia pages:
Condorcet criterion (Condorcet winner)
Arrow’s Impossibility Theorem
Single peaked preferences
Core (game theory)
Condorcet’s Jury Theorem
May’s Theorem
Iowa electronic markets
Winner’s curse
Secretary problem (optimal stopping point)
Day 3
The jury theorem with more than two choices; framing problems and reversal paradoxes
Interest groups and rent seeking
Pay-all auctions and attempts to influence lawmaking
Licensing and other legal monopolies: deadweight loss, rent extraction, structure of legal rules
Where do interest groups succeed?
Externalizing costs

Wikipedia pages:
Bayes’ theorem
Simpson’s paradox (Reversal paradox)
Rent-seeking
Deadweight loss
All-pay auction

Day 4
Minimum size principle
Legal responses to rent seeking and externalized costs: supermajorities, tiers of lawmaking, compensation by government
Wilson-Hayes matrix
Legal Transition rules

Wikipedia pages:
Collective action problem (holdouts)
Bicameralism

Day 5
If time allows:
More on Transitions and Timing: Retroactivity and Sunset and Sunrise provisions
Durability of laws
Tiebout hypothesis and Lawmaking
Harmonization and divergence across legal systems

Wikipedia pages:
Public goods
Eminent domain
Logrolling (minimum winning coalitions)
Tiebout model
Sunset provision
**Reading list** for those who want a head-start:


**Day 1 Bibliography**


**Day 2 Bibliography**


**Lecture 4 Bibliography**

**Day 3 Bibliography**


Day 4 Bibliography


Saul Levmore, Interest Groups and the Durability of Law, in The Timing of Lawmaking (Fagan & Levmore eds.) 171-194


Day 5 Bibliography


Leo Katz, Why the Law is so Perverse (2011).
