Dewey Lecture in Law and Philosophy

Leslie Green, "Right Speech"

Freedom of speech protects speech that is, for example, offensive. But having the right to offend does not give anyone a reason to offend others. How we should speak is a matter for the norms that govern speaking, not the norms that govern responses to speaking. It is a matter of what it is right to do, not a matter of what rights we have. So: what norms should govern us in speaking?

Moshe Halbertal, "Three Concepts of Human Dignity"

Human Dignity has become a central value in political and constitutional thought. Yet its meaning and scope, and its relation to other moral and political values such as autonomy and rights have been elusive. The lecture will explicate the value of Human Dignity through the exploration of three distinct ways in which dignity is violated.

Participating faculty: 
Martha C. Nussbaum
Embedded video: 

Moshe Halbertal, "Three Concepts of Human Dignity"

Human Dignity has become a central value in political and constitutional thought. Yet its meaning and scope, and its relation to other moral and political values such as autonomy and rights have been elusive.

Human Dignity has become a central value in political and constitutional thought. Yet its meaning and scope, and its relation to other moral and political values such as autonomy and rights have been elusive. The lecture will explicate the value of Human Dignity through the exploration of three distinct ways in which dignity is violated.

Dewey Lecture: Three Concepts of Human Dignity - Moshe Halbertal

Date: 
11.11.2015
Location: 
Courtroom
Contact info (email or phone): 

ewellin@uchicago.edu

Human Dignity has become a central value in political and constitutional thought. Yet its meaning and scope, and its relation to other moral and political values such as autonomy and rights have been elusive. The lecture will explicate the value of Human Dignity through the exploration of three distinct ways in which dignity is violated.

Axel Honneth, “Three, Not Two, Concepts of Liberty”

Even for those among us who are not altogether convinced by Isaiah Berlin's famous essay "Two Concepts of Liberty," it has by now become commonplace to adopt a distinction between "negative" and "positive" liberties that largely coincides with the one he offered.

Participating faculty: 
Martha C. Nussbaum
Participating faculty: 
Michael H. Schill
Embedded video: 

Axel Honneth, “Three, Not Two, Concepts of Liberty”

Even for those among us who are not altogether convinced by Isaiah Berlin's famous essay "Two Concepts of Liberty," it has by now become commonplace to adopt a distinction between "negative" and "positive" liberties that largely coincides with the one he offered.

Even for those among us who are not altogether convinced by Isaiah Berlin's famous essay "Two Concepts of Liberty," it has by now become commonplace to adopt a distinction between "negative" and "positive" liberties that largely coincides with the one he offered.

Three, Not Two, Concepts of Liberty - Dewey Lecture with Axel Honneth

Date: 
11.12.2014
Location: 
Weymouth Kirkland Courtroom
Contact info (email or phone): 

Erin Wellin, ewellin@uchicago.edu,773-834-4326

Reception follows.

Barbara Herman, "The Moral Side of Non-Negligence"

Legal discussions of negligence focus on issues of harm, fault, and remedy in the context of failure to exercise reasonable care.  The point of orientation is the negligent event.  In this talk I want to investigate a related moral duty, the duty of due care.

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