News & Media en Geoffrey Stone Appointed Interim Dean <div class="field field-type-text field-field-news-publication"> <div class="field-items"> <div class="field-item odd"> University of Chicago Law School </div> </div> </div> <div class="field field-type-date field-field-datepublished"> <div class="field-items"> <div class="field-item odd"> <span class="date-display-single">May 22, 2015</span> </div> </div> </div> <p><a href="">Geoffrey R. Stone</a> has been appointed to serve as the interim Dean of the Law School, effective July 1, 2015 and continuing until the next dean is named and in place. "This appointment reflects Geof’s ongoing commitment to the University of Chicago, for which he has had a long and distinguished record of leadership," said President Robert J. Zimmer and Provost Eric D. Isaacs in the announcement. "Geof’s appointment will ensure that the positive trajectory of the Law School continues while the faculty committee prepares to make its recommendation for a new dean."</p> <p>Stone is the Edward H. Levi Distinguished Service Professor at the University of Chicago Law School. He joined the faculty in 1973 after serving as a law clerk to Supreme Court Justice William J. Brennan, Jr. He later served as Dean of the Law School from 1987 to 1994 and Provost of the University of Chicago from 1994 to 2002. He is a Fellow of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences and a member of the American Law Institute, the American Philosophical Society, and the National Advisory Council of the American Civil Liberties Union. In recent years, he has served as Chair of the Board of the American Constitution Society. Earlier this year, he chaired the University’s <a href="">Committee on Freedom of Expression</a>.</p> <p>Stone succeeds <a href="">Michael H. Schill</a>, the Harry N. Wyatt Professor of Law, who is leaving the University of Chicago to serve as President of the University of Oregon.&nbsp;</p> <div class="field field-type-nodereference field-field-faculty-news"> <div class="field-items"> <div class="field-item odd"> <div class="field-label-inline-first"> Faculty:&nbsp;</div> <a href="/faculty/stone-g">Geoffrey R. Stone</a> </div> <div class="field-item even"> <div class="field-label-inline"> Faculty:&nbsp;</div> <a href="/faculty/schill">Michael H. Schill</a> </div> </div> </div> Fri, 22 May 2015 16:52:51 +0000 mferzige 28052 at Exam preparation resources at the D’Angelo Law Library The D’Angelo Law Library provides a variety of resources to help students prepare for exams. Past exams: Perhaps most importantly, the Library provides copies of past exams given at the Law School, in addition to model student answers and memos written by the &#8230; <a href="">Continue&#160;reading&#160;<span class="meta-nav">&#187;</span></a> Thu, 21 May 2015 17:36:08 +0000 Todd Ito 'Toil and Trouble in Media-Land': David Strauss Reviews 'The First Amendment Bubble' <div class="field field-type-text field-field-news-title"> <div class="field-items"> <div class="field-item odd"> Toil and Trouble in Media-Land </div> </div> </div> <div class="field field-type-text field-field-news-author"> <div class="field-items"> <div class="field-item odd"> David A. Strauss </div> </div> </div> <div class="field field-type-text field-field-news-publication"> <div class="field-items"> <div class="field-item odd"> The New Rambler </div> </div> </div> <div class="field field-type-date field-field-datepublished"> <div class="field-items"> <div class="field-item odd"> <span class="date-display-single">May 20, 2015</span> </div> </div> </div> <div class="field field-type-text field-field-lead"> <div class="field-items"> <div class="field-item odd"> <p>Amy Gajda’s subject, in <em>The First Amendment Bubble</em>, is not national security and government secrets but personal privacy and ordinary people’s secrets.</p> </div> </div> </div> <p>The Obama Administration is said to have prosecuted more people for leaking classified information than all previous administrations combined. Journalists have noticed. “The Obama Administration is the greatest enemy of press freedom in a generation,” according to James Risen, the New York Times investigative reporter. Risen’s language is unusually strong, but the general theme is familiar among journalists. In a typical comment, Bob Schieffer, a CBS Washington correspondent, is quoted as saying: “Whenever I’m asked what is the most manipulative and secretive administration I’ve covered, I always say it’s the one in office now . . . . This administration exercises more control than George W. Bush’s did, and his before that.”</p> <p>It seems unlikely that this Administration is just more authoritarian or paranoid than the one before it (which was in turn more so than the one before it, and so on), or that this President and Attorney General harbor a perverse desire to antagonize the New York Times and CBS. The much more plausible explanation is that the world has changed, and government officials have responded by becoming less tolerant of practices they might have lived with before. A decade or two ago, internal discipline—firing or demoting employees who disclosed government secrets—might have been enough of a deterrent to leaks. Today the government thinks it needs the threat of a criminal prosecution. And while the Justice Department’s own guidelines require prosecutors to leave journalists alone whenever possible, the government has directed a few warning shots toward journalists, notably in a case involving Risen; it insisted at one point that Risen testify against a government employee who was being prosecuted for leaking to him. (After prevailing in court on the principle, the government ultimately backed off its pursuit of Risen.) But whether the government is right or wrong, things do appear to have changed. Whatever one thinks of their rhetoric, Risen et al. seem right to say that the government is being more aggressive about protecting its secrets than it has been in the past.&nbsp;</p> <p>Amy Gajda’s subject, in&nbsp;<em>The First Amendment Bubble</em>, is not national security and government secrets but personal privacy and ordinary people’s secrets. The laws protecting privacy are, for the most part, enforced not by the government in criminal prosecutions but by individuals in lawsuits for money damages. But Gajda describes a parallel evolution. A generation ago, the courts hearing lawsuits claiming invasions of privacy routinely rejected those claims. In fact those courts often went out of their way to celebrate the press and the role it played in society. But now some people who claim to be exercising their First Amendment rights to freedom of speech and freedom of the press have pushed things too far, Gajda says. They invoke the First Amendment to shield grotesque invasions of people’s privacy and dignity. And there are signs of a backlash. Courts show increasing sympathy for people suing for violations of their privacy and, notably, are increasingly critical of the press in general.</p> <div class="field field-type-text field-field-news-source-url"> <div class="field-items"> <div class="field-item odd"> <div class="field-label-inline-first"> Read more at:&nbsp;</div> <p><a href="" title=""></a></p> </div> </div> </div> <div class="field field-type-nodereference field-field-faculty-news"> <div class="field-items"> <div class="field-item odd"> <div class="field-label-inline-first"> Faculty:&nbsp;</div> <a href="/faculty/strauss">David A. Strauss</a> </div> </div> </div> Wed, 20 May 2015 19:44:42 +0000 willcanderson 27974 at Research Matters: Genevieve Lakier on "The Invention of Low-Value Speech." <div class="field field-type-nodereference field-field-facresearch-abstract"> <div class="field-items"> <div class="field-item odd"> <a href="/faculty/research/genevieve-lakier-invention-low-value-speech">The Invention of Low-Value Speech</a> </div> </div> </div> <div class="field field-type-nodereference field-field-researchmatters-faculty"> <div class="field-label">Faculty member:&nbsp;</div> <div class="field-items"> <div class="field-item odd"> <a href="/faculty/lakier">Genevieve Lakier</a> </div> </div> </div> <div class="field field-type-filefield field-field-image"> <div class="field-items"> <div class="field-item odd"> <div class="filefield-file"><img class="filefield-icon field-icon-image-jpeg" alt="image/jpeg icon" src="" /><a href="" type="image/jpeg; length=11582">lakier-genevieve-2014-resized-for-web.jpg</a></div> </div> </div> </div> <p><span> </span></p> <p><a href=";sort=desc"><em>Research Matters</em></a><em> is a biweekly feature in which a member of the faculty talks about some of his or her latest work and its impact and relevance to law and society.</em></p> <p><span> </span></p> <p><em>Bigelow Teaching Fellow <a href="">Genevieve Lakier</a>, who will join the faculty as an Assistant Professor of Law in July, wrote “</em><em><a href=""><span>The Invention of Low-Value Speech</span></a></em><em>.” In her paper, which will be published in the </em>Harvard Law Review<em>, Lakier challenges the claim that there have always been categories of “low-value speech” that are largely outside the scope of the First Amendment. Drawing on her own rigorous case-by-case examination of the doctrine’s evolution, Lakier argues that these value categories are a more modern invention and that the Court’s reliance on a false historical assumption has discouraged transparent, purpose-based judgments about the constitutional status of speech. The paper was recently <a href="">lauded</a> in an online review as a "careful historical analysis" that is&nbsp;"an important contribution to the field."</em></p> <p><span> </span></p> <p><strong>Q. Why did you write this paper?<br /> </strong>A. It is part of a larger set of articles tracing the changing judicial understanding of what counts as speech for First Amendment purposes. We live in a period — and it has been this way for a decade or two — in which there is a lot of fighting about what qualifies as protected speech. And the stakes are pretty high, given the Supreme Court’s very serious commitment to rigorously enforcing First Amendment rights. The debate tends to be very normative and very philosophical, but its connections to the doctrine are not always so clear. So I wanted to look at the doctrine and try to understand from the cases both the principles that distinguish protected speech from unprotected speech and how those principles have changed over time. There has been significant evolution, and we don’t well understand it.</p> <p><span> </span></p> <p><strong>Q. In the piece, you challenge the assumption that low-value speech is a historical category dating back to the Bill of Rights’ ratification in 1791. How, when, and why did the concept of low-value speech actually emerge?<br /> </strong>A. It emerged in the early twentieth century, right around the time that the Court was inventing the modern First Amendment doctrine. This was in the New Deal period, when the Court was newly committed to vigorously enforcing freedom of speech. The Court wanted to protect a wide array of speech, even when it was harmful, and so it embraced the understanding that the government could almost never regulate speech for its expressive capacity. But this principle raised a lot of problems for the Court, because if applied to all kinds of speech, it threatened to significantly hamper the government’s ability to regulate in general. And so the Court tried to figure out a way to limit the First Amendment without undermining any of the goals of the new jurisprudence, such as protecting dissidents and ensuring that the government couldn’t prevent its citizens from criticizing it. And so the Court developed the idea of the low-value categories, and then proclaimed that these categories had always existed. Of course, they hadn’t always existed.</p> <p><span> </span></p> <p><strong>Q. So they created the value categories <em>and</em> the claim that they had always existed at the same time?<br /> </strong>A. Yes, that’s right.</p> <p><span> </span></p> <p><strong>Q. How was free speech handled before this?<br /> </strong>A. There was liberty of expression, but you didn’t have the right to abuse that liberty by engaging in immoral or improper speech. So although in principle everyone had freedom of speech, in practice courts could punish a tremendous amount of speech that today would be fully protected. What they couldn’t do was restrict speech in advance — no prior restraint, no <em>ex ante </em>regulation<em>. </em>But <em>ex post</em>, if a court deemed speech immoral or improper or disruptive of public order — this was very widely defined — it could be sanctioned. It was that regime that the New Deal Court was trying to change. It was trying to limit the ability of courts to impose on to the Constitution their own views of what was good or bad.</p> <p><span> </span></p> <p><strong>Q. Even in recent years, the Court has emphasized the false historical origins of low-value speech. Why has this assumption persisted?<br /> </strong>A. It’s fascinating. The New Deal Court invoked this history to justify these categories but then didn’t emphasize it so much. But recently, the Roberts Court — led by Justices Antonin Scalia, Anthony Kennedy, and to some degree, Chief Justice John Roberts — has emphasized, to an unprecedented degree, what I describe in the paper as the “invented tradition” of the low-value categories. Since <a href=""><em><span>United States v. Stevens</span></em></a><em> — </em>a 2010 case in which the Court struck down as too broad a law banning videos depicting animal cruelty — the Court has fully committed to a very strict historical test for low-value speech, with potentially significant implications for the future of First Amendment law. The Court says that, in insisting on a historical test of First Amendment boundaries, it is simply doing what it has always done, but it isn’t. In practice, the Court has never relied upon history to distinguish low-value speech from fully protected speech.</p> <p><span> </span></p> <p><strong>Q. Why is this a problem?<br /> </strong>A. The Court’s new test limits the ability of future Courts to recognize novel categories of low-value speech, thus making it really difficult for the government to regulate speech in new ways. To establish the existence of a novel category of low-value speech, the plaintiff or the government now has to show that this is a kind of speech that has been regulated since the eighteenth century. This is particularly difficult for kinds of speech that are the product of new technology. Consider for example personal information—medical records, etc. It’s only recently that we have had the technology to retain or disseminate personal information on a mass scale. Nevertheless, it is both really valuable — marketers and advertisers want it — and potentially really threatening to personal privacy. So there is good reason we may want the government to regulate its dissemination. Yet, if personal information is recognized as speech — which the Court recently suggested it should be — it would almost certainly have to be recognized as high-value speech. As such, regulations designed to protect individual privacy by preventing the dissemination would have to meet a very high bar, and many might as a result be struck down. Conceivably, judges might read the historical record creatively to get a result that would prevent this from happening, but that is worrying too. We don’t want judges smuggling value judgments into what are purportedly objective analyses of historical fact. The continued perception that the boundaries of the First Amendment are set by history and have never changed is thus a real problem — it’s a real problem for the Court, it’s a real problem for the doctrine, and it’s just wrong. The boundaries have never been set by history and they shouldn’t be today.</p> <p><span> </span></p> <p><strong>Q. What do you hope readers will take from the paper?</strong><br /> A. I really want them to understand how tremendously the Court’s understanding of the First Amendment has changed over time. I think with the rise of originalism and with the historical approach of the current Court, there is a tendency to think of constitutional doctrine as static. In practice, that’s just not how it operates. The First Amendment underwent a tremendous transformation in the early twentieth century. It’s fantastic that the Court fashioned this new doctrine, but I want readers to understand that it is a <em>new</em> doctrine. The First Amendment existed prior to that, but it looked very different than it does today.</p> <p><span> </span></p> Wed, 20 May 2015 13:33:16 +0000 beckygillespie 27916 at D’Angelo Law Library restricted access during exams Access to the D’Angelo Law Library for non-law students will be limited from Wednesday, May 20 through Friday, June 5 during the Law School reading and exam periods. During this period, the library will continue to be accessible to any member of &#8230; <a href="">Continue&#160;reading&#160;<span class="meta-nav">&#187;</span></a> Wed, 20 May 2015 13:31:57 +0000 D'Angelo Law Kelo Ten Years Later: The Impact on Eminent Domain, Property Rights, and Homes <div class="field field-type-text field-field-auedio-new-soundcloud"> <div class="field-items"> <div class="field-item odd"> <p><iframe width="100%" height="166" scrolling="no" frameborder="no" src=";color=800000&amp;auto_play=false&amp;hide_related=false&amp;show_comments=true&amp;show_user=true&amp;show_reposts=false"></iframe></p> </div> </div> </div> <p>A panel discussion with</p> <ul> <li>Ilya Somin, George Mason University</li> <li>Nadia Nasser-Ghodsi, Bigelow Fellow at the University of Chicago Law School</li> <li>Professor Lee Fennell, University of Chicago Law School</li> </ul> <p>In 2005 the Supreme Court handed down the controversial decision of Kelo v. City of New London. Ten years later, we ask what the impact of the case has been on the real world. Our panelists address the effects of economic development and blight condemnations on the housing market as well as the state-level reform efforts prompted by the decision.</p> <p>Presented by the Kreisman Initiative on Housing Law and Policy, the Law and Economics Society, and the Federalist Society on May 13, 2015.</p> <div class="field field-type-nodereference field-field-audio-new-event"> <div class="field-items"> <div class="field-item odd"> <div class="field-label-inline-first"> Event listing:&nbsp;</div> <a href="/events/2015-05-13-kelo-ten-years-later">Kelo Ten Years Later</a> </div> </div> </div> <div class="field field-type-nodereference field-field-audio-new-faculty"> <div class="field-items"> <div class="field-item odd"> <div class="field-label-inline-first"> Participating faculty:&nbsp;</div> <a href="/node/22496">Nadia Nasser-Ghodsi</a> </div> <div class="field-item even"> <div class="field-label-inline"> Participating faculty:&nbsp;</div> <a href="/faculty/fennell">Lee Fennell</a> </div> </div> </div> Mon, 18 May 2015 17:46:11 +0000 willcanderson 27935 at D’Angelo Law Library Memorial Day hours On Monday, May 25, the D&#8217;Angelo Law Library will be open from 10 am &#8211; 6 pm. This includes the Reserve Room and the Circulation Desk. The Reference Desk will be closed. Crerar, Mansueto, and Regenstein libraries will be open &#8230; <a href="">Continue&#160;reading&#160;<span class="meta-nav">&#187;</span></a> Mon, 18 May 2015 14:59:11 +0000 D'Angelo Law Can the Law Keep Up with Robots? <div class="field field-type-text field-field-news-author"> <div class="field-items"> <div class="field-item odd"> Claire Stamler-Goody </div> </div> </div> <div class="field field-type-text field-field-news-publication"> <div class="field-items"> <div class="field-item odd"> Law School Communications </div> </div> </div> <div class="field field-type-date field-field-datepublished"> <div class="field-items"> <div class="field-item odd"> <span class="date-display-single">May 18, 2015</span> </div> </div> </div> <div class="field field-type-text field-field-lead"> <div class="field-items"> <div class="field-item odd"> <p>Edward Walters, '96, visited the Law School to&nbsp;discuss how the law evolves as new technology emerges.</p> </div> </div> </div> <p>Preliminary tests on the Google self-driving car have proven it drives more safely than the average person.&nbsp; But even with the latest safety measures, an inevitable accident will force the robotic car to choose exactly what to strike, and according to Edward Walters, ’96, the law—which often struggles to keep up with the rapid pace of advancing technology—currently doesn’t offer any guidance in this situation.</p> <p>Using robots as an example, Walters, the CEO and co-founder of Fastcase and an Adjunct Professor of Law at Georgetown University Law Center (where he teaches The Law of Robots), visited the Law School to discuss how the law evolves as new technology emerges. This talk, sponsored by the Law and Technology Society, examined why new technology often poses questions that the law isn’t equipped to answer.</p> <p>“The car has to make a decision whether to strike a pedestrian, hit a school bus full of kids, or swerve off the road and kill <em>you</em>,” Walters said. Google alone decides what path the self-driving car will take, even though these cars are already allowed on the road in many states.&nbsp;</p> <p>The absence of legislation developed for the self-driving car illustrates a crucial characteristic of the relationship between technology and the law. With each technological revolution (be it industrial, informational, or robotic) the law usually trails behind—in the case of the Industrial Revolution, by about 75 to 100 years.</p> <p>Walters explained this phenomenon using Moore’s Law, which states that the number of transistors on a circuit doubles every two years, making the increase in computing power exponential, not linear. It follows that the capabilities of most electronic devices are increasing so quickly that “the law is constantly chasing technology as it advances.”</p> <p>Some believe that we shouldn’t create new laws for technology at all and that we must rely on common law instead. Walters recalled Senior Lecturer Frank Easterbrook, a judge on the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals, who said during the University of Chicago’s 1995&nbsp;<em>Law of Cyberspace</em> conference, that there shouldn’t be a “law of cyberspace” any more than there was a “law of the horse”—a common law system must apply existing law to new facts. At the same conference, Lawrence Lessig, then a professor at the Law School, argued the opposite. His view was that many technological advances change the underlying assumptions of the law, and that applying existing common law would upset important values of the legal system.</p> <p>Walters believes that it is “not all one or the other” when it comes to regulating new technology. &nbsp;In his Law of Robots course, he teaches that there are some cases where common law can be applied and others where it would yield results that society would find objectionable. There is no formula for determining whether common law will work, but it can help to ask the question, “When you apply the existing common law, does the outcome comport with our notions of fairness?”</p> <p>While the discussion of law and robots may appear to be the stuff of the far future, Walters reminded his listeners that we need to consider regulating this technology right now.</p> <p>“Law of robots sounds like fiction,” he said, “but law of robots is not our future, it is our present.”</p> <p>Examples are everywhere. Walters pointed out that robots are responsible, in part, for manufacturing cars, performing surgeries, trading stocks, and policing borders.&nbsp;Machines already do this work, almost invisibly, but there is very little thinking being done about how and whether we can apply existing law to increasingly autonomous machines.</p> <p>At the end of the talk, students asked Walters questions, and many revolved around the law of self-driving cars. One student wondered if excessive regulation of these vehicles could reduce their efficiency. Efficiency is relative, as evidenced by Walters’ counter-question:</p> <p>“If you knew that Google programmed your self-driving car to save the most lives over saving yours, would you buy that car?”</p> <div class="field field-type-filefield field-field-image"> <div class="field-items"> <div class="field-item odd"> <div class="filefield-file"><img class="filefield-icon field-icon-image-jpeg" alt="image/jpeg icon" src="" /><a href="" type="image/jpeg; length=133088">robot_talk_photo_bigger_crop.jpg</a></div> </div> </div> </div> Mon, 18 May 2015 14:49:02 +0000 clairesg 27917 at National Law Journal: "Chicago Students Police the Police" <div class="field field-type-text field-field-news-title"> <div class="field-items"> <div class="field-item odd"> Chicago Students Police the Police </div> </div> </div> <div class="field field-type-text field-field-news-author"> <div class="field-items"> <div class="field-item odd"> Karen Sloan </div> </div> </div> <div class="field field-type-text field-field-news-publication"> <div class="field-items"> <div class="field-item odd"> The National Law Journal </div> </div> </div> <div class="field field-type-date field-field-datepublished"> <div class="field-items"> <div class="field-item odd"> <span class="date-display-single">May 18, 2015</span> </div> </div> </div> <div class="field field-type-text field-field-lead"> <div class="field-items">