News & Media http://www.law.uchicago.edu/feeds/newsandmedia.rss en Alison Siegler, “The Courts of Appeals’ Latest Sentencing Rebellion” http://www.law.uchicago.edu/audio/alison-siegler-%E2%80%9C-courts-appeals%E2%80%99-latest-sentencing-rebellion%E2%80%9D <div class="field field-type-text field-field-auedio-new-soundcloud"> <div class="field-items"> <div class="field-item odd"> <p><iframe width="100%" height="166" scrolling="no" frameborder="no" src="https://w.soundcloud.com/player/?url=https%3A//api.soundcloud.com/tracks/207658418&amp;color=800000&amp;auto_play=false&amp;hide_related=false&amp;show_comments=true&amp;show_user=true&amp;show_reposts=false"></iframe></p> </div> </div> </div> <p>For over twenty-five years, federal courts of appeals have rebelled against every Supreme Court mandate that weakens the federal sentencing Guidelines. That rebellion has intensified since the Court dealt a blow to the Guidelines a decade ago by making them advisory, rather than mandatory. This ruling dramatically limited the courts of appeals’ authority to reverse district court sentences that deviate from the Guidelines. Rather than accepting this limitation on their power, the courts of appeals fought against it by overpolicing sentences that deviated from the Guidelines and underpolicing sentences that fell within the Guidelines. The Supreme Court has responded to these mutinies with stinging reversals that emphasize the district courts’ significant discretion and the advisory nature of the Guidelines. This talk discusses these ongoing battles between the courts of appeals and the Supreme Court, including a new revolt the courts of appeals are staging that violates not only Supreme Court precedent, but the federal sentencing statute and the Constitution as well. Because the courts of appeals are unlikely to back down, Professor Siegler calls on the Supreme Court to step in and stop this latest rebellion.</p> <p>Alison Siegler is Clinical Professor of Law and Director of the Federal Criminal Justice Clinic at the University of Chicago Law School.</p> <p>Recorded on April 13, 2015, as part of the Chicago’s Best Ideas lecture series.</p> <div class="field field-type-nodereference field-field-audio-new-event"> <div class="field-items"> <div class="field-item odd"> <div class="field-label-inline-first"> Event listing:&nbsp;</div> <a href="/events/2015-04-13-chicago%E2%80%99s-best-ideas-alison-siegler-%E2%80%9C-courts-appeals%E2%80%99-latest-sentencing-rebellion%E2%80%9D">Chicago’s Best Ideas: Alison Siegler “The Courts of Appeals’ Latest Sentencing Rebellion”</a> </div> </div> </div> <div class="field field-type-nodereference field-field-audio-new-faculty"> <div class="field-items"> <div class="field-item odd"> <div class="field-label-inline-first"> Participating faculty:&nbsp;</div> <a href="/faculty/siegler">Alison Siegler</a> </div> </div> </div> <div class="field field-type-nodereference field-field-audio-new-video"> <div class="field-items"> <div class="field-item odd"> <div class="field-label-inline-first"> Related video:&nbsp;</div> <a href="/video/alison-siegler-courts-of-appeals-latest-sentencing-rebellion">Alison Siegler, “The Courts of Appeals’ Latest Sentencing Rebellion”</a> </div> </div> </div> <div class="field field-type-nodereference field-field-audio-new-article"> <div class="field-items"> <div class="field-item odd"> <div class="field-label-inline-first"> Related article:&nbsp;</div> <a href="/news/spring-cbis-offer-insights-reasonable-expectations-sentencing-guidelines-and-psychology-corpora">Spring CBIs Offer Insights on Reasonable Expectations, Sentencing Guidelines, and the Psychology of Corporate Rights</a> </div> </div> </div> Thu, 28 May 2015 15:50:13 +0000 willcanderson 28091 at http://www.law.uchicago.edu Alison Siegler, “The Courts of Appeals’ Latest Sentencing Rebellion” http://www.law.uchicago.edu/video/alison-siegler-courts-of-appeals-latest-sentencing-rebellion <div class="field field-type-text field-field-lead"> <div class="field-items"> <div class="field-item odd"> <p>For over twenty-five years, federal courts of appeals have rebelled against every Supreme Court mandate that weakens the federal sentencing Guidelines.</p> </div> </div> </div> <p><iframe width="560" height="315" src="https://www.youtube.com/embed/oGu2FzbpXl0?rel=0&amp;showinfo=0" frameborder="0" allowfullscreen></iframe></p> <p>For over twenty-five years, federal courts of appeals have rebelled against every Supreme Court mandate that weakens the federal sentencing Guidelines. That rebellion has intensified since the Court dealt a blow to the Guidelines a decade ago by making them advisory, rather than mandatory. This ruling dramatically limited the courts of appeals’ authority to reverse district court sentences that deviate from the Guidelines. Rather than accepting this limitation on their power, the courts of appeals fought against it by overpolicing sentences that deviated from the Guidelines and underpolicing sentences that fell within the Guidelines. The Supreme Court has responded to these mutinies with stinging reversals that emphasize the district courts’ significant discretion and the advisory nature of the Guidelines. This talk discusses these ongoing battles between the courts of appeals and the Supreme Court, including a new revolt the courts of appeals are staging that violates not only Supreme Court precedent, but the federal sentencing statute and the Constitution as well. Because the courts of appeals are unlikely to back down, Professor Siegler calls on the Supreme Court to step in and stop this latest rebellion.</p> <p>Alison Siegler is Clinical Professor of Law and Director of the Federal Criminal Justice Clinic at the University of Chicago Law School.</p> <p>Recorded on April 13, 2015, as part of the Chicago’s Best Ideas lecture series.</p> <div class="field field-type-text field-field-sidebar-position"> <div class="field-items"> <div class="field-item odd"> Right </div> </div> </div> Thu, 28 May 2015 15:37:35 +0000 willcanderson 28090 at http://www.law.uchicago.edu Aristotle’s De Motu Animalium: Workshop Celebrates of the 40th Anniversary of Martha Nussbaum’s PhD Thesis http://www.law.uchicago.edu/news/aristotle%E2%80%99s-de-motu-animalium-workshop-celebrates-40th-anniversary-martha-nussbaum%E2%80%99s-phd-thesis <div class="field field-type-text field-field-news-author"> <div class="field-items"> <div class="field-item odd"> Dhananjay Jagannathan </div> </div> </div> <div class="field field-type-text field-field-news-publication"> <div class="field-items"> <div class="field-item odd"> Law School Communications </div> </div> </div> <div class="field field-type-date field-field-datepublished"> <div class="field-items"> <div class="field-item odd"> <span class="date-display-single">May 28, 2015</span> </div> </div> </div> <div class="field field-type-text field-field-lead"> <div class="field-items"> <div class="field-item odd"> <p>Forty years ago, Martha Nussbaum, the Ernst Freund Distinguished Service Professor of Law and Ethics, submitted her Harvard doctoral dissertation on Aristotle’s little-known treatise&nbsp;<em>On the motion of animals</em>.</p> </div> </div> </div> <p><em>Dhananjay Jagannathan has studied ancient Greek and Roman philosophy at the Universities of Texas, Oxford, and Cambridge. He is presently writing a doctoral dissertation on Aristotle's ethics at the University of Chicago under the supervision of Martha Nussbaum and Gabriel Lear.</em></p> <p>Forty years ago, Martha Nussbaum, the Ernst Freund Distinguished Service Professor of Law and Ethics, submitted her Harvard doctoral dissertation on Aristotle’s little-known treatise <em>On the motion of animals</em>. For centuries the treatise, typically known by its Latin title <em>De Motu Animalium</em>, had languished in a backwater of the Aristotelian corpus, neglected by classicists, historians of science, and philosophers, in part due to ill-founded doubts about its authenticity.</p> <p>As leading scholars of Aristotle gathered on May 15 and 16 at the Law School to mark the anniversary of the dissertation, discussion ranged over the transmission of the texts of Aristotle from antiquity, Aristotle’s enormously influential but widely misunderstood teleological natural philosophy, and the ethical significance of the complexities of animal life. The dissertation broke new ground in each of these areas, and was published in revised form three years later as <em>Aristotle’s De Motu Animalium</em> (Princeton University Press, 1978), with text, translation, commentary, and interpretive essays on major philosophical themes. The conference, therefore, was an opportunity for new and longtime readers of Aristotle to return to this work with an eye to the conversations sparked by its publication in the decades since.</p> <p>Perhaps most remarkable is the confirmation in recent work by Oliver Primavesi of the Munich School of Ancient Philosophy, who co-organized the conference with Yale University’s David Charles, of Nussbaum’s bold hypothesis that the manuscripts of <em>De Motu Animalium</em> betray traces of influence from a lost edition of the text. Since scholars must compare the surviving versions and weigh alternate readings in order to establish what the text of Aristotle looked like in antiquity, finding even a trace of an independent textual tradition could lead to significant changes. As it happens, two manuscripts analyzed by Primavesi, which had previously been misidentified and so ignored, are perfect examples of this independent tradition. The result is some 86 alternate readings in a text of fewer than 10 pages in the standard edition.</p> <p>Nussbaum’s edition of the text was the product not only of a careful re-inspection of known manuscripts but also of a fresh investigation of sources such as the thirteenth century Latin translation of William of Moerbeke, who had access to now-lost Greek manuscripts, as well as of philosophical insight into what Aristotle could and could not have been saying. While the discussion of Primavesi’s work largely focused on how this or that difficult passage in the text of the <em>De Motu </em>should be read, the participants concluded by exhorting the next generation of scholars of ancient philosophy to undertake such philosophically informed textual criticism.</p> <p>The three other speakers revisited the contributions Nussbaum made in her work on the <em>De Motu</em> to the interpretation of Aristotle’s systematic thought and to contemporary philosophy, each indicating substantial sympathy to the goals of her work while also raising points of resistance to her arguments.</p> <p>Christof Rapp began by taking up the nature and purpose of the <em>De Motu</em>, which fearlessly interweaves an account of the psychological and biological underpinnings of animal movement with cosmological reflections. Nussbaum claimed in her 1978 book that the <em>De Motu </em>showed that Aristotle eventually came to adopt a flexible approach to the interrelation of the sciences, as he considered whether the special case of animal motion provided confirmation for or posed a challenge to his natural philosophy. Rapp argued that the treatise’s overarching goal is to identify how the soul moves the body, which leaves the discussion of cosmology as either a source of insight into general principles of motion or a deviation from the argument that neither violates Aristotle’s separation of the sciences nor supports Nussbaum’s integrative view.</p> <p>In his talk, David Charles defended Nussbaum’s view that when Aristotle analyzed animal self-movement using concepts from his theory of logical inference, he was trying to schematize goal-directed behavior not characterize practical reasoning. That is why the <em>De Motu</em> engages in the project of explaining animal and human action at the same time, since practical thinking plays the role for us that desire plays for other animals. Charles then proposed an amendment to this view, claiming that Aristotle takes the conclusions drawn in practical thought to be causally responsible for bringing about actions and not constitutive of the actions themselves.</p> <p>Finally, Klaus Corcilius spoke on one of the most philosophically exciting aspects of Nussbaum’s interpretation of Aristotle, the idea that imagination (<em>phantasia</em>) plays a central role in the life of animals. Corcilius claimed that few critics of Nussbaum’s interpretation have realized its philosophical significance as an account of animal agency, that is, as making sense of how animals are not automata but respond intelligently to their environments. He nevertheless argued that we need not accept Nussbaum’s thesis that imagination is essentially interpretive, since perception and desire can do most of the work for non-rational animals.</p> <p>The conference concluded with Nussbaum’s reflections on how her early work on Aristotle has continued to inform her more recent work in moral and political philosophy, such as her 2004 book <em>Hiding from Humanity: Disgust, Shame, and the Law</em> (Princeton) and her 2006 <em>Frontiers of Justice: Disability, Nationality, Species Membership </em>(Harvard). Nussbaum noted that Aristotle himself does not draw out conclusions for ethics in the <em>De Motu</em>, but that its central idea of giving a common account of human and animal movement suggests that we must both explore our animal nature, which many traditions of philosophical and religious thought have tended to deny or obscure, and take up the difficult moral questions involved in treating other animals properly.</p> <div class="field field-type-nodereference field-field-faculty-news"> <div class="field-items"> <div class="field-item odd"> <div class="field-label-inline-first"> Faculty:&nbsp;</div> <a href="/faculty/nussbaum">Martha Nussbaum</a> </div> </div> </div> <div class="field field-type-filefield field-field-image"> <div class="field-items"> <div class="field-item odd"> <div class="filefield-file"><img class="filefield-icon field-icon-image-jpeg" alt="image/jpeg icon" src="http://www.law.uchicago.edu/profiles/palantirprofile/modules/filefield/icons/image-x-generic.png" /><a href="http://www.law.uchicago.edu/files/image/aristotle_conf_3.jpg" type="image/jpeg; length=2434495">aristotle_conf_3.jpg</a></div> </div> </div> </div> Thu, 28 May 2015 14:54:07 +0000 beckygillespie 28076 at http://www.law.uchicago.edu Anthony Sanders, "State Constitutions, Unenumerated Rights, and Economic Liberties" http://www.law.uchicago.edu/audio/anthony-sanders-state-constitutions-unenumerated-rights-and-economic-liberties <div class="field field-type-text field-field-auedio-new-soundcloud"> <div class="field-items"> <div class="field-item odd"> <p><iframe width="100%" height="166" scrolling="no" frameborder="no" src="https://w.soundcloud.com/player/?url=https%3A//api.soundcloud.com/tracks/207527534&amp;color=800000&amp;auto_play=false&amp;hide_related=false&amp;show_comments=true&amp;show_user=true&amp;show_reposts=false"></iframe></p> </div> </div> </div> <p>With commentary by Louis Michael Seidman, Carmack Waterhouse Professor of Constitutional Law at Georgetown Law</p> <p>Anthony Sanders is an attorney at the Institute for Justice Minnesota office (IJ-MN) where he litigates cutting-edge constitutional cases protecting economic liberty, private property, freedom of speech and other individual liberties in both federal and state courts across the country.&nbsp; </p> <p>Prior to joining IJ-MN, Anthony served as a law clerk to Justice W. William Leaphart on the Montana Supreme Court.&nbsp; Anthony also worked for several years in private practice in Chicago.</p> <p>Anthony received his law degree cum laude from the University of Minnesota Law School in 2004, where he served as an articles submission editor for the Minnesota Law Review.&nbsp; Anthony received his undergraduate degree from Hamline University in St. Paul, Minnesota, and his master’s degree from the University of Wisconsin-Madison.</p> <p>Anthony has published several articles in leading law reviews, including an analysis of state constitutional protections of economic liberties in all 50 states.</p> <p>Recorded on May 18, 2015, and presented by the Federalist Society.</p> Wed, 27 May 2015 20:56:52 +0000 willcanderson 28087 at http://www.law.uchicago.edu Spring CBIs Offer Insights on Reasonable Expectations, Sentencing Guidelines, and the Psychology of Corporate Rights http://www.law.uchicago.edu/news/spring-cbis-offer-insights-reasonable-expectations-sentencing-guidelines-and-psychology-corpora <div class="field field-type-text field-field-news-author"> <div class="field-items"> <div class="field-item odd"> Becky Beaupre Gillespie </div> </div> </div> <div class="field field-type-text field-field-news-publication"> <div class="field-items"> <div class="field-item odd"> Law School Communications </div> </div> </div> <div class="field field-type-date field-field-datepublished"> <div class="field-items"> <div class="field-item odd"> <span class="date-display-single">May 26, 2015</span> </div> </div> </div> <div class="field field-type-text field-field-lead"> <div class="field-items"> <div class="field-item odd"> <p>The Law School’s popular “Chicago’s Best Ideas” series continued this spring with talks that explored the psychology of corporate constitutional rights, reasonable expectations in property law, and a judicial rebellion over federal sentencing guidelines.</p> </div> </div> </div> <p><span> </span></p> <p>The Law School’s popular “Chicago’s Best Ideas” series continued this spring with talks that explored the psychology of corporate constitutional rights, reasonable expectations in the law, and a judicial rebellion over federal sentencing guidelines.</p> <p><span> </span></p> <p>Clinical Professor Alison Siegler, Director of the <a href="http://www.law.uchicago.edu/clinics/mandel/fcjc"><span>Federal Criminal Justice Clinic</span></a>, kicked off the spring lineup by calling on the US Supreme Court to quell a federal appellate court rebellion that has hampered the ability of district courts to impose more lenient sentences and has encouraged judges to impose sentences within the federal sentencing guidelines. The courts of appeals, unhappy with limits on their own sentencing authority, have been overpolicing district court sentences that fall below the guidelines and underpolicing sentences that fall within the guidelines — actions that violate the US Constitution, Supreme Court precedent, and the federal sentencing statute, Siegler argued.</p> <p><span> </span></p> <p>“It’s important for district judges to have the discretion and the authority to impose individualized sentences based on full and nuanced consideration of the characteristics of the defendant and the circumstances of the offense,” Siegler said. “We want district judges to have that authority — (they) are the ones who sit at the front lines. They have the institutional competence to play that role. They see and hear all the evidence.”</p> <p><span> </span></p> <p>The rebellion, the latest in an ongoing judicial battle over who controls sentencing, has threatened what Siegler said is an appropriate level of district court discretion. In the past, the balance of power has swung to both extremes: during America’s first 200 years, district courts had total sentencing discretion, but between 1989 and 2005, they were sharply limited by mandatory sentencing guidelines. That changed with the US Supreme Court’s 2005 ruling in <a href="http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2004/2004_04_104/"><em><span>U.S. v. Booker</span></em></a>, which gave district courts greater discretion to impose sentences outside federal guidelines.</p> <p><span> </span></p> <p>“In my mind, the three eras of sentencing fit neatly into the 'Goldilocks porridge' framework," she said.&nbsp;"The first era was characterized by unfettered district court discretion and no appellate power to police; let’s call that the ‘too hot’ era. The second era was characterized by virtually no district court discretion and unfettered appellate power to police; I called that the ‘too cold’ era. The mandatory guidelines required judges to ignore all the complexity of human beings and the human experience and just reduce everybody to a range of months. The current, third era is characterized by substantial district court discretion and limited appellate power to police sentences — and, in my mind, this balance is just right.”</p> <p><span> </span></p> <p>To illustrate the how the distribution of sentencing power impacts people, families, and communities, Siegler told the story of a clinic client named Brian, who had pled guilty to a nonviolent federal crime. A factory worker and single dad from Chicago’s Englewood neighborhood, Brian had overcome a tough childhood to become a volunteer football and wrestling coach for at-risk teens, one of whom later said that Brian had “taught me how me how to live my life.” But Brian was facing four years in prison under the guidelines — a punishment that Siegler and her students had argued would do more harm than good.</p> <p><span> </span></p> <p>“After the judge came to understand Brian as a person … he sentenced him to probation,” Siegler said. “That was a year ago, and Brian is doing great. He has been promoted at work, and he continues to mentor the kids in his community. But if the judge had not had the power, the authority, and the discretion to impose a below-guidelines sentence in that case, it would have cost taxpayers $120,000 to incarcerate Brian for those four years. Worse still, Brian would have lost his job and his ability to support his family, his daughter would have lost her only parent, and his students would have lost their coach, who was keeping them on the right track.”</p> <p><span> </span></p> <p><strong>Aziz Huq: <em>Hobby Lobby</em> and the Psychology of Corporate Rights</strong></p> <p><span> </span></p> <p>Professor Aziz Huq, a Herbert and Marjorie Fried Teaching Scholar, took on a topic that incorporated both law and psychology, discussing an ongoing empirical study about how cases like <a href="http://www.oyez.org/cases/2010-2019/2013/2013_13_354"><em><span>Burwell v. Hobby Lobby</span></em></a> have influenced public perceptions of both corporate constitutional rights and of the Supreme Court.</p> <p><span> </span></p> <p>In a series of three studies, Huq and his collaborators — a psychology professor and a business professor — examined people’s willingness to grant privacy, religious liberty, and free speech rights within various business contexts and explored whether perceptions of corporate versus individual rights were influenced by political ideology. In their study, both liberals and conservatives tended to value individual rights over corporate rights, but liberals were more likely to see individual and corporate rights as being in conflict while conservatives viewed them as complementary.</p> <p><span> </span></p> <p>The study, however, also offered the opportunity to examine how a particular ruling, such as the 2014 <em>Hobby Lobby</em> decision, impacts these perceptions. In <em>Hobby Lobby</em>, the Court for the first time recognized a for-profit corporation’s claim of religious belief, ruling that closely held corporations with religious owners cannot be required to pay for insurance coverage of contraception.</p> <p><span> </span></p> <p>“The <em>Hobby Lobby</em> opinion was a couple of months away, and we thought this was an opportunity to look at whether the Supreme Court, by issuing a ruling, can influence what people believe about a question that is, in one sense, legal — but in another sense is normative,” Huq said. “It’s a belief that isn’t predicated on certain facts about the law, or facts about the world; it’s predicated on people’s beliefs about what’s right or proper.”</p> <p><span> </span></p> <p>When they examined the data by ideology, the scholars found that conservatives became more supportive of corporate religious liberty after <em>Hobby Lobby</em>, and liberals became much less supportive. Conservatives also became more supportive of the Court, indicating that they felt a stronger obligation to obey the ruling, and liberals became less supportive. They became more skeptical, less trusting, and more likely to see bias, Huq said.</p> <p><span> </span></p> <p>“The obvious takeaway is that the effect of a Supreme Court ruling is contingent upon your ideology,” Huq said. “It’s not the case that people are passive recipients … If you’re inclined to agree with the Court <em>ex ante</em>, as we know conservatives were pre-<em>Hobby Lobby</em>, you are likely to feel confirmed and justified by the Court’s ruling. You’re likely to hold that same normative view, but more deeply.”</p> <p><span> </span></p> <p>But if you don’t agree with a decision, he said, “you’re likely to double down whatever view it was you initially held.”</p> <p><span> </span></p> <p><strong>Richard Epstein: Reasonable and Unreasonable Expectations in Property Law and Beyond</strong></p> <p><span> </span></p> <p>In his CBI talk, Richard A. Epstein, the James Parker Hall Distinguished Service Professor Emeritus of Law and Senior Lecturer, discussed the notion of reasonable expectations in law and argued that, contrary to the conventional wisdom, the doctrine is best used when its main purpose is to facilitate cooperation. He discussed a number of applications in areas ranging from property rights to search and seizure to privacy, emphasizing many of the limitations.</p> <p>For instance, the idea of “reasonable expectations” often produces a circular argument: “The effort to say that we can figure out the use of reasonable expectations to determine what the legal boundaries are is a mistake because once you know what the law is, the only reasonable expectation you have is you either comply with this thing or something goes wrong with it,” he said.</p> <p>In property law, the notion of reasonable expectations has come into play when applying New York City’s Landmarks Preservation Law, which empowers the city to designate, and regulate, certain properties or neighborhoods as historic. In the landmark 1978 case <a href="http://www.oyez.org/cases/1970-1979/1977/1977_77_444"><em>Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City</em></a>, the owners of Grand Central Station, who had been denied the right to construct a building over the terminal by the city’s Landmark Preservation Commission, claimed they were entitled to use that airspace and that denying that use constituted an unconstitutional taking of state-protected air rights. The Court rejected their claim, saying that the regulation didn’t interfere with what it deemed the “primary expectation” that the terminal could continue in its present use; nor did it prevent the owners from realizing a reasonable rate of return on the initial investment.</p> <p>But this application of the doctrine failed in a number of ways. Most notably, it did not maximize overall social welfare, Epstein said.</p> <p>“What the doctrine of reasonable expectations is designed to do is to tell each party, either public or private, the way in which he has to behave such that if the other fellow behaves in a complementary fashion, the situation will produce optimal results for both of them,” Epstein said, noting that there are many examples of such cooperative behavior in both law and in social practice.&nbsp;</p> <p>For example, if two people are having a conversation in a public park, it is reasonable to assume a certain degree of privacy — for instance, that others nearby will not deliberately eavesdrop. But it is also reasonable for those others to expect that the two won’t talk so loud that others can’t help but overhear, he said. That form of cooperation should be possible between all random pairs of individuals, given the applicable social norm, he said.</p> <p>In cases like <em>Penn Central</em>, the “series of judicially imposed expectations … are profoundly unreasonable because they are separated from a system of property law, which encourages divided interests. Nor does that system relate to the fundamentals of cooperation,” he said.</p> <p>What we want to, he said, “is go to an area where expectations are reasonable precisely because … the law is trying to understand how people maximize their joint welfare through cooperative behavior.”</p> <p><span> </span></p> <div class="field field-type-nodereference field-field-faculty-news"> <div class="field-items"> <div class="field-item odd"> <div class="field-label-inline-first"> Faculty:&nbsp;</div> <a href="/faculty/epstein">Richard A. Epstein</a> </div> <div class="field-item even"> <div class="field-label-inline"> Faculty:&nbsp;</div> <a href="/faculty/siegler">Alison Siegler</a> </div> <div class="field-item odd"> <div class="field-label-inline"> Faculty:&nbsp;</div> <a href="/faculty/huq">Aziz Huq</a> </div> </div> </div> <div class="field field-type-filefield field-field-image"> <div class="field-items"> <div class="field-item odd"> <div class="filefield-file"><img class="filefield-icon field-icon-image-jpeg" alt="image/jpeg icon" src="http://www.law.uchicago.edu/profiles/palantirprofile/modules/filefield/icons/image-x-generic.png" /><a href="http://www.law.uchicago.edu/files/image/346_cbi.jpg" type="image/jpeg; length=3155775">346_cbi.jpg</a></div> </div> </div> </div> Tue, 26 May 2015 15:37:31 +0000 beckygillespie 27950 at http://www.law.uchicago.edu Stone: Congress Should Reform Surveillance Laws (and ex-NSA Chief Agrees) http://www.law.uchicago.edu/news/stone-congress-should-reform-surveillance-laws-and-ex-nsa-chief-agrees <div class="field field-type-text field-field-news-title"> <div class="field-items"> <div class="field-item odd"> Opinion: An ex-NSA chief and ACLU adviser can agree on surveillance reform. Why can&#039;t Congress? </div> </div> </div> <div class="field field-type-text field-field-news-author"> <div class="field-items"> <div class="field-item odd"> Geoffrey Stone and Keith Alexander </div> </div> </div> <div class="field field-type-text field-field-news-publication"> <div class="field-items"> <div class="field-item odd"> Christian Science Monitor </div> </div> </div> <div class="field field-type-date field-field-datepublished"> <div class="field-items"> <div class="field-item odd"> <span class="date-display-single">May 23, 2015</span> </div> </div> </div> <p>The current debate over surveillance has been divisive and polarizing. But if a constitutional law professor and an American Civil Liberties Union advisory board member can find common ground with a former director of the National Security Agency and Army general, then Congress should be able to arrive at a compromise on surveillance reform as well.</p> <p>As Americans, we share these bedrock principles: that freedom, privacy, and individual liberty are fundamental American values; that a core responsibility of our government is to keep our nation and our people safe; that the collection of intelligence is essential in the modern world to protect our nation’s security; and that, at present, the trust of the American people has been eroded and needs to be reestablished with new safeguards that ensure that the agencies charged with carrying out the collection of intelligence do so in a manner that is consistent with our deepest national values.&nbsp;</p> <p>That is not to say that the nation’s intelligence agencies have abused their authority. To the contrary, the NSA and other intelligence agencies have worked conscientiously to operate within the express authorities that Congress, the White House, and the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance (FISA) Court have given them. Indeed, the men and women who work at NSA and other national security agencies deserve our admiration and support. Although intelligence agencies often operate out of necessity in secret, in our experience they adhere to the rule of law and comply with multiple layers of effective oversight.&nbsp;</p> <div class="field field-type-text field-field-news-source-url"> <div class="field-items"> <div class="field-item odd"> <div class="field-label-inline-first"> Read more at:&nbsp;</div> <p><a href="http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Passcode/Passcode-Voices/2015/0523/Opinion-An-ex-NSA-chief-and-ACLU-adviser-can-agree-on-surveillance-reform.-Why-can-t-Congress" title="http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Passcode/Passcode-Voices/2015/0523/Opinion-An-ex-NSA-chief-and-ACLU-adviser-can-agree-on-surveillance-reform.-Why-can-t-Congress">http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Passcode/Passcode-Voices/2015/0523/Opinio...</a></p> </div> </div> </div> <div class="field field-type-nodereference field-field-faculty-news"> <div class="field-items"> <div class="field-item odd"> <div class="field-label-inline-first"> Faculty:&nbsp;</div> <a href="/faculty/stone-g">Geoffrey R. Stone</a> </div> </div> </div> Sun, 24 May 2015 23:44:30 +0000 mferzige 28059 at http://www.law.uchicago.edu Geoffrey Stone Appointed Interim Dean http://www.law.uchicago.edu/news/geoffrey-stone-appointed-interim-dean <div class="field field-type-text field-field-news-publication"> <div class="field-items"> <div class="field-item odd"> University of Chicago Law School </div> </div> </div> <div class="field field-type-date field-field-datepublished"> <div class="field-items"> <div class="field-item odd"> <span class="date-display-single">May 22, 2015</span> </div> </div> </div> <p><a href="http://www.law.uchicago.edu/faculty/stone-g">Geoffrey R. Stone</a> has been appointed to serve as the interim Dean of the Law School, effective July 1, 2015 and continuing until the next dean is named and in place. "This appointment reflects Geof’s ongoing commitment to the University of Chicago, for which he has had a long and distinguished record of leadership," said President Robert J. Zimmer and Provost Eric D. Isaacs in the announcement. "Geof’s appointment will ensure that the positive trajectory of the Law School continues while the faculty committee prepares to make its recommendation for a new dean."</p> <p>Stone is the Edward H. Levi Distinguished Service Professor at the University of Chicago Law School. He joined the faculty in 1973 after serving as a law clerk to Supreme Court Justice William J. Brennan, Jr. He later served as Dean of the Law School from 1987 to 1994 and Provost of the University of Chicago from 1994 to 2002. He is a Fellow of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences and a member of the American Law Institute, the American Philosophical Society, and the National Advisory Council of the American Civil Liberties Union. In recent years, he has served as Chair of the Board of the American Constitution Society. Earlier this year, he chaired the University’s <a href="http://provost.uchicago.edu/FOECommitteeReport.pdf">Committee on Freedom of Expression</a>.</p> <p>Stone succeeds <a href="http://www.law.uchicago.edu/faculty/schill">Michael H. Schill</a>, the Harry N. Wyatt Professor of Law, who is leaving the University of Chicago to serve as President of the University of Oregon.&nbsp;</p> <div class="field field-type-nodereference field-field-faculty-news"> <div class="field-items"> <div class="field-item odd"> <div class="field-label-inline-first"> Faculty:&nbsp;</div> <a href="/faculty/stone-g">Geoffrey R. Stone</a> </div> <div class="field-item even"> <div class="field-label-inline"> Faculty:&nbsp;</div> <a href="/faculty/schill">Michael H. Schill</a> </div> </div> </div> Fri, 22 May 2015 16:52:51 +0000 mferzige 28052 at http://www.law.uchicago.edu Exam preparation resources at the D’Angelo Law Library http://news.lib.uchicago.edu/blog/2015/05/21/exam-preparation-resources-at-the-dangelo-law-library-3/ The D’Angelo Law Library provides a variety of resources to help students prepare for exams. Past exams: Perhaps most importantly, the Library provides copies of past exams given at the Law School, in addition to model student answers and memos written by the &#8230; <a href="http://news.lib.uchicago.edu/blog/2015/05/21/exam-preparation-resources-at-the-dangelo-law-library-3/">Continue&#160;reading&#160;<span class="meta-nav">&#187;</span></a> Thu, 21 May 2015 17:36:08 +0000 Todd Ito http://news.lib.uchicago.edu/?p=27028 'Toil and Trouble in Media-Land': David Strauss Reviews 'The First Amendment Bubble' http://www.law.uchicago.edu/news/toil-and-trouble-media-land-david-strauss-reviews-first-amendment-bubble <div class="field field-type-text field-field-news-title"> <div class="field-items"> <div class="field-item odd"> Toil and Trouble in Media-Land </div> </div> </div> <div class="field field-type-text field-field-news-author"> <div class="field-items"> <div class="field-item odd"> David A. Strauss </div> </div> </div> <div class="field field-type-text field-field-news-publication"> <div class="field-items"> <div class="field-item odd"> The New Rambler </div> </div> </div> <div class="field field-type-date field-field-datepublished"> <div class="field-items"> <div class="field-item odd"> <span class="date-display-single">May 20, 2015</span> </div> </div> </div> <div class="field field-type-text field-field-lead"> <div class="field-items"> <div class="field-item odd"> <p>Amy Gajda’s subject, in <em>The First Amendment Bubble</em>, is not national security and government secrets but personal privacy and ordinary people’s secrets.</p> </div> </div> </div> <p>The Obama Administration is said to have prosecuted more people for leaking classified information than all previous administrations combined. Journalists have noticed. “The Obama Administration is the greatest enemy of press freedom in a generation,” according to James Risen, the New York Times investigative reporter. Risen’s language is unusually strong, but the general theme is familiar among journalists. In a typical comment, Bob Schieffer, a CBS Washington correspondent, is quoted as saying: “Whenever I’m asked what is the most manipulative and secretive administration I’ve covered, I always say it’s the one in office now . . . . This administration exercises more control than George W. Bush’s did, and his before that.”</p> <p>It seems unlikely that this Administration is just more authoritarian or paranoid than the one before it (which was in turn more so than the one before it, and so on), or that this President and Attorney General harbor a perverse desire to antagonize the New York Times and CBS. The much more plausible explanation is that the world has changed, and government officials have responded by becoming less tolerant of practices they might have lived with before. A decade or two ago, internal discipline—firing or demoting employees who disclosed government secrets—might have been enough of a deterrent to leaks. Today the government thinks it needs the threat of a criminal prosecution. And while the Justice Department’s own guidelines require prosecutors to leave journalists alone whenever possible, the government has directed a few warning shots toward journalists, notably in a case involving Risen; it insisted at one point that Risen testify against a government employee who was being prosecuted for leaking to him. (After prevailing in court on the principle, the government ultimately backed off its pursuit of Risen.) But whether the government is right or wrong, things do appear to have changed. Whatever one thinks of their rhetoric, Risen et al. seem right to say that the government is being more aggressive about protecting its secrets than it has been in the past.&nbsp;</p> <p>Amy Gajda’s subject, in&nbsp;<em>The First Amendment Bubble</em>, is not national security and government secrets but personal privacy and ordinary people’s secrets. The laws protecting privacy are, for the most part, enforced not by the government in criminal prosecutions but by individuals in lawsuits for money damages. But Gajda describes a parallel evolution. A generation ago, the courts hearing lawsuits claiming invasions of privacy routinely rejected those claims. In fact those courts often went out of their way to celebrate the press and the role it played in society. But now some people who claim to be exercising their First Amendment rights to freedom of speech and freedom of the press have pushed things too far, Gajda says. They invoke the First Amendment to shield grotesque invasions of people’s privacy and dignity. And there are signs of a backlash. Courts show increasing sympathy for people suing for violations of their privacy and, notably, are increasingly critical of the press in general.</p> <div class="field field-type-text field-field-news-source-url"> <div class="field-items"> <div class="field-item odd"> <div class="field-label-inline-first"> Read more at:&nbsp;</div> <p><a href="http://newramblerreview.com/book-reviews/law/toil-and-trouble-in-media-land" title="http://newramblerreview.com/book-reviews/law/toil-and-trouble-in-media-land">http://newramblerreview.com/book-reviews/law/toil-and-trouble-in-media-land</a></p> </div> </div> </div> <div class="field field-type-nodereference field-field-faculty-news"> <div class="field-items"> <div class="field-item odd"> <div class="field-label-inline-first"> Faculty:&nbsp;</div> <a href="/faculty/strauss">David A. Strauss</a> </div> </div> </div> Wed, 20 May 2015 19:44:42 +0000 willcanderson 27974 at http://www.law.uchicago.edu Research Matters: Genevieve Lakier on "The Invention of Low-Value Speech." http://www.law.uchicago.edu/node/27916 <div class="field field-type-nodereference field-field-facresearch-abstract"> <div class="field-items"> <div class="field-item odd"> <a href="/faculty/research/genevieve-lakier-invention-low-value-speech">The Invention of Low-Value Speech</a> </div> </div> </div> <div class="field field-type-nodereference field-field-researchmatters-faculty"> <div class="field-label">Faculty member:&nbsp;</div> <div class="field-items"> <div class="field-item odd"> <a href="/faculty/lakier">Genevieve Lakier</a> </div> </div> </div> <div class="field field-type-filefield field-field-image"> <div class="field-items"> <div class="field-item odd"> <div class="filefield-file"><img class="filefield-icon field-icon-image-jpeg" alt="image/jpeg icon" src="http://www.law.uchicago.edu/profiles/palantirprofile/modules/filefield/icons/image-x-generic.png" /><a href="http://www.law.uchicago.edu/files/image/lakier-genevieve-2014-resized-for-web_0.jpg" type="image/jpeg; length=11582">lakier-genevieve-2014-resized-for-web.jpg</a></div> </div> </div> </div> <p><span> </span></p> <p><a href="http://www.law.uchicago.edu/faculty/research?order=nid&amp;sort=desc"><em>Research Matters</em></a><em> is a biweekly feature in which a member of the faculty talks about some of his or her latest work and its impact and relevance to law and society.</em></p> <p><span> </span></p> <p><em>Bigelow Teaching Fellow <a href="http://www.law.uchicago.edu/faculty/lakier">Genevieve Lakier</a>, who will join the faculty as an Assistant Professor of Law in July, wrote “</em><em><a href="http://www.law.uchicago.edu/faculty/research/genevieve-lakier-invention-low-value-speech"><span>The Invention of Low-Value Speech</span></a></em><em>.” In her paper, which will be published in the </em>Harvard Law Review<em>, Lakier challenges the claim that there have always been categories of “low-value speech” that are largely outside the scope of the First Amendment. Drawing on her own rigorous case-by-case examination of the doctrine’s evolution, Lakier argues that these value categories are a more modern invention and that the Court’s reliance on a false historical assumption has discouraged transparent, purpose-based judgments about the constitutional status of speech. The paper was recently <a href="http://conlaw.jotwell.com/how-do-we-know-when-speech-is-of-low-value/">lauded</a> in an online review as a "careful historical analysis" that is&nbsp;"an important contribution to the field."</em></p> <p><span> </span></p> <p><strong>Q. Why did you write this paper?<br /> </strong>A. It is part of a larger set of articles tracing the changing judicial understanding of what counts as speech for First Amendment purposes. We live in a period — and it has been this way for a decade or two — in which there is a lot of fighting about what qualifies as protected speech. And the stakes are pretty high, given the Supreme Court’s very serious commitment to rigorously enforcing First Amendment rights. The debate tends to be very normative and very philosophical, but its connections to the doctrine are not always so clear. So I wanted to look at the doctrine and try to understand from the cases both the principles that distinguish protected speech from unprotected speech and how those principles have changed over time. There has been significant evolution, and we don’t well understand it.</p> <p><span> </span></p> <p><strong>Q. In the piece, you challenge the assumption that low-value speech is a historical category dating back to the Bill of Rights’ ratification in 1791. How, when, and why did the concept of low-value speech actually emerge?<br /> </strong>A. It emerged in the early twentieth century, right around the time that the Court was inventing the modern First Amendment doctrine. This was in the New Deal period, when the Court was newly committed to vigorously enforcing freedom of speech. The Court wanted to protect a wide array of speech, even when it was harmful, and so it embraced the understanding that the government could almost never regulate speech for its expressive capacity. But this principle raised a lot of problems for the Court, because if applied to all kinds of speech, it threatened to significantly hamper the government’s ability to regulate in general. And so the Court tried to figure out a way to limit the First Amendment without undermining any of the goals of the new jurisprudence, such as protecting dissidents and ensuring that the government couldn’t prevent its citizens from criticizing it. And so the Court developed the idea of the low-value categories, and then proclaimed that these categories had always existed. Of course, they hadn’t always existed.</p> <p><span> </span></p> <p><strong>Q. So they created the value categories <em>and</em> the claim that they had always existed at the same time?<br /> </strong>A. Yes, that’s right.</p> <p><span> </span></p> <p><strong>Q. How was free speech handled before this?<br /> </strong>A. There was liberty of expression, but you didn’t have the right to abuse that liberty by engaging in immoral or improper speech. So although in principle everyone had freedom of speech, in practice courts could punish a tremendous amount of speech that today would be fully protected. What they couldn’t do was restrict speech in advance — no prior restraint, no <em>ex ante </em>regulation<em>. </em>But <em>ex post</em>, if a court deemed speech immoral or improper or disruptive of public order — this was very widely defined — it could be sanctioned. It was that regime that the New Deal Court was trying to change. It was trying to limit the ability of courts to impose on to the Constitution their own views of what was good or bad.</p> <p><span> </span></p> <p><strong>Q. Even in recent years, the Court has emphasized the false historical origins of low-value speech. Why has this assumption persisted?<br /> </strong>A. It’s fascinating. The New Deal Court invoked this history to justify these categories but then didn’t emphasize it so much. But recently, the Roberts Court — led by Justices Antonin Scalia, Anthony Kennedy, and to some degree, Chief Justice John Roberts — has emphasized, to an unprecedented degree, what I describe in the paper as the “invented tradition” of the low-value categories. Since <a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States_v._Stevens"><em><span>United States v. Stevens</span></em></a><em> — </em>a 2010 case in which the Court struck down as too broad a law banning videos depicting animal cruelty — the Court has fully committed to a very strict historical test for low-value speech, with potentially significant implications for the future of First Amendment law. The Court says that, in insisting on a historical test of First Amendment boundaries, it is simply doing what it has always done, but it isn’t. In practice, the Court has never relied upon history to distinguish low-value speech from fully protected speech.</p> <p><span> </span></p> <p><strong>Q. Why is this a problem?<br /> </strong>A. The Court’s new test limits the ability of future Courts to recognize novel