Brian Leiter
John P. Wilson Professor of Law and Director, Center for Law, Philosophy, and Human Values
1111 East 60th Street, Room 425
Chicago, IL 60637
phone: 773 702-0953
email: bleiter@uchicago.edu

Current Year Courses

• 41601 1 Evidence
  This course examines the law governing proof of disputed propositions of fact in criminal and civil trials, including relevance, character evidence, the hearsay "rule" and other rules of exclusion, and examination and privileges of witnesses. The student's grade is based on a proctored exam.
  Winter (3)
  
  
• 47411 1 Jurisprudence I: Theories of Law and Adjudication
  An examination of classic jurisprudential questions in and around the theory of adjudication: the theory of how judges actually do decide cases and how they ought to decide them. These questions include: Do legal rules really constrain judicial decision-making? What makes a rule (or norm) a rule of the legal system? Are principles of morality legally binding even when such principles have not been enacted into a law by a legislature? (Relatedly, are there objective principles of morality?) When no legal norm controls a case, how ought judges to decide that case? Can there be "right" answers to legal disputes, even when informed judges and lawyers disagree about the answer? Are there principles or methods of legal reasoning that constrain judicial decision-making, or is legal reasoning essentially indeterminate, such that a skillful judge can justify more than one outcome for any given dispute? Is judicial decision-making really distinct from political decision-making of the sort legislators engage in? Readings drawn exclusively from major twentieth-century schools of thought - especially American Legal Realism (e.g., Karl Llewellyn, Jerome Frank), Natural Law (e.g., Ronald Dworkin, John Finnis), and Legal Positivism (e.g., H.L.A. Hart, Joseph Raz) - supplemented by other pertinent readings (from Leslie Green, Richard Posner, and the instructor, among others). No familiarity with either jurisprudence or philosophy will be presupposed, though some readings will be philosophically demanding, and the course will sometimes venture into (and explain) cognate philosophical issues in philosophy of language and metaethics as they are relevant to the core jurisprudential questions. Take-home essay exam.
  Autumn (3)
  
  
• 47421 1 Jurisprudence II: Topics in Moral, Political, and Legal Theory
  The course examines from a philosophical point of view topics and themes that are broadly familiar to lawyers and legal scholars, but which are not always treated with the attention to argumentative detail and the nuances of competing positions that are characteristic of philosophical inquiry. (Philosophy is "thinking in slow motion" as one English philosopher has helpfully put it.) The primary emphasis is on the philosophical treatment of these topics (with some attention to legal examples and problems). The instructor will try to cover topics responsive to student interests, ordinarily choosing from the following menu of possible subjects: (1) liberty and its limits; (2) theories of utility and well-being; (3) the objectivity of ethics and law; (4) the idea of "critical theories" of society and of law; (5) meaning, language, and the interpretation of texts in law and elsewhere; (6) freedom and responsibility; (7) liberalism and illiberalism in moral and political theory. Readings will be drawn from authors both historical (e.g., Plato, Mill, Hart, Marx, Marcuse, Horkheimer, Nietzsche, Hayek, Sidgwick, Grice, Mackie, Feinberg, Brandt, Rawls) and contemporary (e.g., Parfit, Railton, Geuss, Lyons, Harman, Brink, Scalia, Dworkin, Unger, R. Posner, and the instructor). Jurisprudence I is not a prerequisite. Some experience reading philosophical texts is helpful. Take-home essay exam.
  Spring (3) e
  
  
• 49901 50 Independent Research
  Second- and third-year students may earn course credit by independent research under the supervision of a member of the faculty. Such projects are arranged by consultation between the student and the particular member of the faculty in whose field the proposed topic falls.
  Autumn (3)
  
  
• 61512 1 Workshop: Law and Philosophy
  This year's Law and Philosophy Workshop is on the topic "Toleration and Religious Liberty." Religious toleration has long been the paradigm of the liberal ideal of toleration of group differences, as reflected in both the constitutions of the major Western democracies and in the theoretical literature explaining and justifying these practices. While the historical reasons for the special pride of place accorded religious toleration are familiar, what is surprising is that no one has been able to articulate a credible principled argument for tolerating religion qua religion: that is, an argument that would explain why, as a matter of moral or other principle, we ought to accord special legal and moral treatment to religious practices. There are, to be sure, principled arguments for why the state ought to tolerate a plethora of private choices, commitments, and practices of its citizenry, but none of these appear to single out religion for anything like the special treatment it is accorded in, for example, American and Canadian constitutional law. The Workshop's central question will be: is there a principled reason to tolerate religion qua religion? Or do principled reasons for tolerance fail to distinguish religious belief from other matters of conscience? Sessions will address the nature of toleration (and its relationship to cognate notions like respect), different moral arguments for toleration, the nature of religion, and differing legal approaches (including the American) to protecting religious liberty. Students may get a better idea for the concerns of the Workshop from Professor Leiter's paper "Why Tolerate Religion?", available on his SSRN page here: http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=904640. All sessions will take place on Mondays from 4-6 pm in the Law School. There will be a dinner with the speaker following each session, for which students may sign up in advance. Readings for each session will be circulated in advance (More information to follow). Students who would like to take the workshop as a course for credit should contact Brian Leiter (bleiter@uchicago.edu) by September 19, 2008. Please send a resume, a brief description of your interests and background relevant to the course, including a list of prior coursework in philosophy, political theory and constitutional law (please list instructors, if you can recall them).
  Autumn (1) a, b, c/l
  
  

Other courses taught include:

EVIDENCE

An examination of the federal rules governing proof at trial. On many points, the rules of most states are the same or similar (New York and California have the most differences, though even they have significant overlap with the Federal Rules). There will be somewhat more lecture than in a typical course, in order to facilitate coverage of material. Even so, certain relatively minor or easy topics will not be covered (Burdens of Proof, Presumptions, Judicial Notice), and others will be covered only briefly (e.g., Privileges, Impeachment of Witnesses). Approximately two-thirds of the term will be devoted to the two central topics in the law of evidence: relevance and hearsay (including the hearsay exceptions).

JURISPRUDENCE I: THEORIES OF LAW AND ADJUDICATION

An examination of classic jurisprudential questions in and around the theory of adjudication: the theory of how judges actually do decide cases and how they ought to decide them. These questions include: Do legal rules really constrain judicial decision-making? What makes a rule (or norm) a rule of the legal system? Are principles of morality legally binding even when such principles have not been enacted into a law by a legislature? (Relatedly, are there objective principles of morality?) When no legal norm controls a case, how ought judges to decide that case? Can there be "right" answers to legal disputes, even when informed judges and lawyers disagree about the answer? Are there principles or methods of legal reasoning that constrain judicial decision-making, or is legal reasoning essentially indeterminate, such that a skillful judge can justify more than one outcome for any given dispute? Is judicial decision-making really distinct from political decision-making of the sort legislators engage in? Readings drawn exclusively from major twentieth-century schools of thought--especially American Legal Realism (e.g., Karl Llewellyn, Jerome Frank), Natural Law (e.g., Ronald Dworkin, John Finnis), and Legal Positivism (e.g., H.L.A. Hart, Joseph Raz)—supplemented by other pertinent readings (from Leslie Green, Richard Posner, and the instructor, among others). No familiarity with either jurisprudence or philosophy will be presupposed, though some readings will be philosophically demanding, and the course will sometimes venture into (and explain) cognate philosophical issues in philosophy of language and metaethics as they are relevant to the core jurisprudential questions. Take-home essay exam.

JURISPRUDENCE II: TOPICS IN MORAL, POLITICAL, AND LEGAL THEORY
The course examines from a philosophical point of view topics and themes that are broadly familiar to lawyers and legal scholars, but which are not always treated with the attention to argumentative detail and the nuances of competing positions that are characteristic of philosophical inquiry. (Philosophy is “thinking in slow motion” as one English philosopher has helpfully put it.) The primary emphasis is on the philosophical treatment of these topics (with some attention to legal examples and problems). The instructor will try to cover topics responsive to student interests, ordinarily choosing from the following menu of possible subjects: (1) liberty and its limits; (2) theories of utility and well-being; (3) the objectivity of ethics and law; (4) the idea of "critical theories" of society and of law; (5) meaning, language, and the interpretation of texts in law and elsewhere; (6) freedom and responsibility; (7) liberalism and illiberalism in moral and political theory. Readings will be drawn from authors both historical (e.g., Plato, Mill, Hart, Marx, Marcuse, Horkheimer, Nietzsche, Hayek, Sidgwick, Grice, Mackie, Feinberg, Brandt, Rawls) and contemporary (e.g., Parfit, Railton, Geuss, Lyons, Harman, Brink, Scalia, Dworkin, Unger, R. Posner, and the instructor). Jurisprudence I is not a prerequisite. Some experience reading philosophical texts is helpful. Take-home essay exam.